The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Your Understanding Is My Understanding: Evidence for a Community of Knowledge
Abstract
In four experiments, we tested the community-of-knowledge hypothesis, that people fail to distinguish their own knowledge from other people’s knowledge. In all the experiments, despite the absence of any actual explanatory information, people rated their own understanding of novel natural phenomena as higher when they were told that scientists understood the phenomena than when they were told that scientists did not yet understand them. In Experiment 2, we found that this occurs only when people have ostensible access to the scientists’ explanations; the effect does not occur when the explanations exist but are held in secret. In Experiment 3, we further ruled out two classes of alternative explanations (one appealing to task demands and the other proposing that judgments were mediated by inferences about a phenomenon’s understandability). In Experiment 4, we ruled out the possibility that the effect could be attributed to a pragmatic inference.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Simply being aware that others understand how something works can result in people overestimating how much they understand the same phenomenon 65 .”
From Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility (2022) · cites this paper as [65]
Citations
Cites
Kripke, S. A. (1972) · Semantics of Natural Language · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9 · Cited by 7,028
Six views of embodied cognition
Wilson, M. (2002) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03196322 · Cited by 4,782
Transactive Memory: A Contemporary Analysis of the Group Mind
Wegner, D. M. (1987) · Theories of Group Behavior · doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-4634-3_9 · Cited by 2,700 · cited 1×
“Giuliano (cited by Wegner, 1987) and Wegner (1987) found not only that each member of a couple defers to the other’s expertise to store and recall items relevant to that expertise, but also that the effort one member makes to remember is inversely proportional to his or her partner’s expertise.”
BackgroundGoogle Effects on Memory: Cognitive Consequences of Having Information at Our Fingertips
Sparrow, B., Liu, J., & Wegner, D. M. (2011) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1207745 · Cited by 1,762
The essential child: origins of essentialism in everyday thought
(2003) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.41-1239 · Cited by 1,377
The Essential Child: Origins of Essentialism in Everyday Thought
Gelman, S. A. (2003) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195154061.001.0001 · Cited by 1,247
Natural Theories of Mind: Evolution, Development and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading.
Lock, A., & Whiten, A. (1992) · Man · doi:10.2307/2804075 · Cited by 1,081
The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations
Weisberg, D. S., Keil, F. C., Goodstein, J., Rawson, E., & Gray, J. R. (2008) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn.2008.20040 · Cited by 1,063
The misunderstood limits of folk science: An illusion of explanatory depth
Rozenblit, L., & Keil, F. (2002) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1207/s15516709cog2605_1 · Cited by 1,032
Hardwig, J. (1985) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2026523 · Cited by 937
How we know--and sometimes misjudge--what others know: Imputing one's own knowledge to others.
Nickerson, R. S. (1999) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037//0033-2909.125.6.737 · Cited by 836
The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis
Camerer, C., Loewenstein, G., & Weber, M. (1989) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261651 · Cited by 755
Comments on Part I: Psychological essentialism
Medin, D., & Ortony, A. (1989) · Similarity and Analogical Reasoning · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511529863.009 · Cited by 674
A Computer Network Model of Human Transactive Memory
Wegner, D. M. (1995) · Social Cognition · doi:10.1521/soco.1995.13.3.319 · Cited by 671
Seeing is believing: The effect of brain images on judgments of scientific reasoning
McCabe, D. P., & Castel, A. D. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.07.017 · Cited by 656
Young children's reasoning about beliefs
Wellman, H. M., & Bartsch, K. (1988) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(88)90021-2 · Cited by 518
The Curse of Knowledge in Reasoning About False Beliefs
Birch, S. A. J., & Bloom, P. (2007) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01909.x · Cited by 451
Political Extremism Is Supported by an Illusion of Understanding
Fernbach, P. M., Rogers, T., Fox, C. R., & Sloman, S. A. (2013) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797612464058 · Cited by 396
Self-citationSearching for explanations: How the Internet inflates estimates of internal knowledge.
Fisher, M., Goddu, M. K., & Keil, F. C. (2015) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000070 · Cited by 330
Saving-Enhanced Memory: The Benefits of Saving on the Learning and Remembering of New Information
Storm, B. C., & Stone, S. M. (2015) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797614559285 · Cited by 192
Apperly, I. A., Back, E., Samson, D., & France, L. K. (2007) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.05.005 · Cited by 186
Superfluous Neuroscience Information Makes Explanations of Psychological Phenomena More Appealing
Fernandez‐Duque, D., Evans, J., Christian, C. B., & Hodges, S. D. (2014) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00750 · Cited by 160
Missing the trees for the forest: A construal level account of the illusion of explanatory depth.
Alter, A. L., Oppenheimer, D. M., & Zemla, J. C. (2010) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0020218 · Cited by 158
When Knowledge Knows No Bounds: Self-Perceived Expertise Predicts Claims of Impossible Knowledge
Atir, S., Rosenzweig, E. L., & Dunning, D. A. (2015) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797615588195 · Cited by 157
Keil, F. C., Stein, C. B., Webb, L. M., Billings, V. D., & Rozenblit, L. (2008) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1080/03640210701863339 · Cited by 149
The Shadows and Shallows of Explanation
Wilson, R. A., & Keil, F. C. (1998) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1023/a:1008259020140 · Cited by 148
Tal, A., & Wansink, B. C. (2014) · Public Understanding of Science · doi:10.1177/0963662514549688 · Cited by 115
Deconstructing the seductive allure of neuroscience explanations
Weisberg, D., Taylor, J. C. V., & Hopkins, E. J. (2015) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s193029750000557x · Cited by 109
On the (non)persuasive power of a brain image
Michael, R. B., Newman, E. J., Vuorre, M., Cumming, G., & Garry, M. (2013) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/s13423-013-0391-6 · Cited by 106
The Curse of Expertise: When More Knowledge Leads to Miscalibrated Explanatory Insight
Fisher, M., & Keil, F. C. (2015) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.12280 · Cited by 103
Welbourne, M. (1981) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2219401 · Cited by 90
Persuasive images in popular science: Testing judgments of scientific reasoning and credibility
Gruber, D., & Dickerson, J. (2012) · Public Understanding of Science · doi:10.1177/0963662512454072 · Cited by 87
Look Again: Effects of Brain Images and Mind–Brain Dualism on Lay Evaluations of Research
Hook, C. J., & Farah, M. J. (2013) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00407 · Cited by 81
Keehner, M., Mayberry, L., & Fischer, M. H. (2011) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/s13423-010-0048-7 · Cited by 65
Fooled by the brain: Re-examining the influence of neuroimages
Schweitzer, N. J., Baker, D., & Risko, E. F. (2013) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2013.08.009 · Cited by 59
Widner, R. L., Smith, S. M., & Graziano, W. G. (1996) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1423392 · Cited by 50
One with the Cloud: Why People Mistake the Internet's Knowledge for Their Own
Ward, A. F. (2013) · Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) · Cited by 40
Scientese and Ambiguous Citations in the Selling of Unproven Medical Treatments
Haard, J., Slater, M. D., & Long, M. (2004) · Health Communication · doi:10.1207/s15327027hc1604_2 · Cited by 37
Ikeda, K., Kitagami, S., Takahashi, T., Hattori, Y., & Ito, Y. (2013) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/s13423-013-0457-5 · Cited by 30
Overestimation of Knowledge About Word Meanings: The “Misplaced Meaning” Effect
Kominsky, J. F., & Keil, F. C. (2014) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.12122 · Cited by 25
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- 10.1037/0033-2909.125.6.737 · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.6.737 · Paper page
- Putnam H. (1975). The meaning of “meaning.” In Gunderson K. (Ed.), Language, mind, and knowledge (pp. 131–193). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Sloman S., 2007, Integrating the mind: Domain general versus domain specific processes in higher cognition, 105
Cited by
Artificial intelligence and illusions of understanding in scientific research
Messeri, L., & Crockett, M. J. (2024) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-024-07146-0 · Cited by 707
Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility
Porter, T., Elnakouri, A., Meyers, E. A., Shibayama, T., Jayawickreme, E., & Grossmann, I. (2022) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-022-00081-9 · Cited by 248
Effects of Credibility Indicators on Social Media News Sharing Intent
Yaqub, W., Kakhidze, O., Brockman, M. L., Memon, N., & Patil, S. (2020) · Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3313831.3376213 · Cited by 171
“Sloman and Rabb [58] found that “knowing that experts understand a phenomenon gives individuals the sense that they understand it better themselves, but only if they believe they have access to the experts’ explanation.””
BackgroundThe illusion of explanatory depth and endorsement of conspiracy beliefs
Vitriol, J. A., & Marsh, J. K. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2504 · Cited by 118
Individual Representation in a Community of Knowledge
Rabb, N., Fernbach, P. M., & Sloman, S. A. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2019.07.011 · Cited by 122
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Sloman, S. A., & Rabb, N.
- Affiliations
- Brown University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Rabb, Nathaniel
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2016-09-30
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 1451-1460
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2524005976
- Cited by
- 88
- References
- 40
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 5
- FWCI
- 17.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
- Locations
- Psychological Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Education › Science Education and Pedagogy
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- epistemic knowledge, scientific knowledge, explanation, natural phenomena, pragmatic inference
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Attention, Cognition, Female, Humans, Judgment, Male, Task Performance and Analysis, Knowledge, Comprehension
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.