How we know--and sometimes misjudge--what others know: Imputing one's own knowledge to others.
Abstract
To communicate effectively, people must have a reasonably accurate idea about what specific other people know. An obvious starting point for building a model of what another knows is what one oneself knows, or thinks one knows. This article reviews evidence that people impute their own knowledge to others and that, although this serves them well in general, they often do so uncritically, with the result of erroneously assuming that other people have the same knowledge. Overimputation of one's own knowledge can contribute to communication difficulties. Corrective approaches are considered. A conceptualization of where own-knowledge imputation fits in the process of developing models of other people's knowledge is proposed.
Cites (19)
- Logic and ConversationGrice, H. P. · 1975 · Speech Acts
- Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and BiasesTversky, Amos, Kahneman, Daniel · 1975 · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making
- Thought and languageVygotsky, L. S. · 1964 · Bulletin of the Orton Society
- Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probabilityTversky, Amos, Kahneman, Daniel · 1973 · Cognitive Psychology
- Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?Premack, David, Woodruff, Guy · 1978 · Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- The Preference for Self-Correction in the Organization of Repair in ConversationSchegloff, Emanuel A., Jefferson, Gail, Sacks, Harvey · 1977 · Language
- Transactive Memory: A Contemporary Analysis of the Group MindWegner, Daniel M. · 1987 · Theories of Group Behavior
- Metamemory: A Theoretical Framework and New FindingsNelson, Thomas O. · 1990 · Psychology of Learning and Motivation
- Pooling of Unshared Information in Group Decision Making: Biased Information Sampling During DiscussionStasser, Garold, Titus, William · 1985 · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Three-year-olds’ difficulty with false belief: The case for a conceptual deficitPerner, Josef, Leekam, Susan R., Wimmer, Heinz · 1987 · British Journal of Developmental Psychology
Cited by (40)
- On seeing human: A three-factor theory of anthropomorphismEpley, Nicholas, Waytz, Adam, Cacioppo, John T. · 2007 · Psychological Review
- Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.Kahneman, Daniel, Frederick, Shane · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
- The functional architecture of human empathyDecety, Jean, Jackson, Philip L. · 2004 · Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews
- The Affect HeuristicSlovic, Paul, Finucane, Melissa, Peters, Ellen, MacGregor, Donald G. · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
- The origins and nature of compassion focused therapyGilbert, Paul · 2014 · British Journal of Clinical Psychology
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: How we know--and sometimes misjudge--what others know: Imputing one's own knowledge to others. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//0033-2909.125.6.737
- The paper
- Nickerson, R. S. (1999). How we know--and sometimes misjudge--what others know: Imputing one's own knowledge to others. Psychological Bulletin. https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-2909.125.6.737
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.