How we know--and sometimes misjudge--what others know: Imputing one's own knowledge to others.

Raymond S. Nickerson·1999·Psychological Bulletin

Abstract

To communicate effectively, people must have a reasonably accurate idea about what specific other people know. An obvious starting point for building a model of what another knows is what one oneself knows, or thinks one knows. This article reviews evidence that people impute their own knowledge to others and that, although this serves them well in general, they often do so uncritically, with the result of erroneously assuming that other people have the same knowledge. Overimputation of one's own knowledge can contribute to communication difficulties. Corrective approaches are considered. A conceptualization of where own-knowledge imputation fits in the process of developing models of other people's knowledge is proposed.

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    Decety, Jean, Jackson, Philip L. · 2004 · Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews
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How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: How we know--and sometimes misjudge--what others know: Imputing one's own knowledge to others. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//0033-2909.125.6.737
The paper
Nickerson, R. S. (1999). How we know--and sometimes misjudge--what others know: Imputing one's own knowledge to others. Psychological Bulletin. https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-2909.125.6.737

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