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Cited by 328Misinformation and Its ImpactsParanormal Experiences and BeliefsEducation, Healthcare and Sociology Research

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 74 of the 77 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Contesting epistemic authority: Conspiracy theories on the boundaries of science

Harambam, Jaron, Aupers, Stef·2015·Public Understanding of Science
DOI 10.1177/0963662514559891
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Abstract

Conspiracy theories are immensely popular today, yet in the social sciences they are often dismissed as “irrational,” “bad science,” or “religious belief.” In this study, we take a cultural sociological approach and argue that this persistent disqualification is a form of “boundary work” that obscures rather than clarifies how and why conspiracy theorists challenge the epistemic authority of science. Based on a qualitative study of the Dutch conspiracy milieu, we distinguish three critiques that are motivated by encounters with scientific experts in everyday life: the alleged dogmatism of modern science, the intimate relation of scientific knowledge production with vested interests, and the exclusion of lay knowledge by scientific experts forming a global “power elite.” Given their critique that resonates with social scientific understandings of science, it is concluded that conspiracy theorists compete with (social) scientists in complex battles for epistemic authority in a broader field of knowledge contestation.

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Crossref · 10.1177/0963662514559891

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74 of 74 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. Aaronovitch D, 2010, Voodoo Histories: How Conspiracy Theory Has Shaped Modern History
  2. Campbell C, 1972, Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain, 5, 119
  3. Falzon MA, 2012, Multi-Sited Ethnography: Theory, Practice and Locality in Contemporary Research
  4. Fassin D, 2011, Brown Journal of World Affairs, 17, 39
  5. Foucault M, 1970, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences
  6. Glaser BG, 1967, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research
  7. Sheldrake R, 2013, The Science Delusion: Freeing the Spirit of Inquiry

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Metadata

Authors
Harambam, J., & Aupers, S.
Affiliations
  • Erasmus University Rotterdam (NL)
  • KU Leuven (BE)
ORCID
Venue
Public Understanding of Science
Publisher
SAGE Publications
Published
2014-12-01
Volume
24
Issue
4
Pages
466-480
ISSN
  • 0963-6625 (ISSN-L)
  • 1361-6609
DOI
10.1177/0963662514559891
OpenAlex
W2066753585
Cited by
328
References
77
Citations by year
2026: 50 · 2025: 46 · 2024: 35 · 2023: 30 · 2022: 45 · 2021: 25 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 44 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 1
FWCI
21.63
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
Locations
  • Public Understanding of Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • EUR Research Repository (Erasmus University Rotterdam) (publishedVersion)
  • EUR Research Repository (Erasmus University Rotterdam) (submittedVersion)
  • Lirias (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Education, Healthcare and Sociology Research
Keywords
conspiracy theories, epistemic authority, boundary work, science and religion, lay knowledge, scientific expertise, power elite, knowledge contestation
MeSH terms
Culture, Delusions, Public Opinion, Science, Knowledge, Trust

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