Of conspiracy theories
Abstract
As the end of the Millennium approaches, conspiracy theories are increasing in number and popularity. In this short essay, I offer an analysis of conspiracy theories inspired by Hume's discussion of miracles. My first conclusion is that whereas Hume can argue that miracles are, by definition, explanations we are not warranted in believing, there is nothing analytic that will allow us to distinguish good from bad conspiracy theories. There is no a priori method for distinguishing warranted conspiracy theories (say, those explaining Watergate) from those which are unwarranted (say, theories about extraterrestrials abducting humans). Nonetheless, there is a cluster of characteristics often shared by unwarranted conspiracy theories. An analysis of the alleged explanatory virtues of unwarranted conspiracies suggests some reasons for their current popularity, while at the same time providing grounds for their rejection. Finally, I discuss how conspiracy theories embody an anachronistic world-view that places the contemporary zeitgeist in a clearer light.
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Conspiracy theories rely on isolated morsels of evidence inconsistent with an official account while ignoring overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
“conspiracy theories rely on isolated morsels of evidence inconsistent with an official account [31] (e.g., that Timothy McVeigh fled the Oklahoma City bombing in a car without licence plates) while ignoring overwhelming evidence to the contrary”
From The Role of Conspiracist Ideation and Worldviews in Predicting Rejection of Science (2013) · cites this paper as [31]
Evidence against conspiracy theories is often construed as evidence for them, because the evidence is interpreted as arising from the conspiracy in question.
“evidence against conspiracy theories is often construed as evidence for them, because the evidence is interpreted as arising from the conspiracy in question”
From The Role of Conspiracist Ideation and Worldviews in Predicting Rejection of Science (2013) · cites this paper as [31]
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- Authors
- Keeley, B. L.
- Affiliations
- Washington University in St. Louis (US)
- Corresponding author
- Keeley, Brian L.
- ORCID
- Keeley, Brian L.
- Venue
- The Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1999-03
- Volume
- 96
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 109
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1505155904
- Cited by
- 581
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 30 · 2025: 50 · 2024: 70 · 2023: 72 · 2022: 80 · 2021: 42 · 2020: 53 · 2019: 25 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 15 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 8
- FWCI
- 11.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
- Keywords
- conspiracy theories, David Hume, miracles, epistemic warrant, explanation, Watergate, anachronism
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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