CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 1,450Autism Spectrum Disorder ResearchChild and Animal Learning DevelopmentAction Observation and Synchronization

Autism: beyond “theory of mind”

Frith, Uta, Happé, Francesca·1994·Cognition
DOI 10.1016/0010-0277(94)90024-8
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

The theory of mind account of autism has been remarkably successful in making specific predictions about the impairments in socialization, imagination and communication shown by people with autism. It cannot, however, explain either the non-triad features of autism, or earlier experimental findings of abnormal assets and deficits on non-social tasks. These unexplained aspects of autism, and the existence of autistic individuals who consistently pass false belief tasks, suggest that it may be necessary to postulate an additional cognitive abnormality. One possible abnormality-weak central coherence--is discussed, and preliminary evidence for this theory is presented.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/0010-0277(94)90024-8

Cites

93 of 93 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Even when autistic people show enhanced performance on visuo-perceptual tasks, such strengths are invariably characterised as a by-product of a deficit in higher-order cognition.

    “Even when autistic people show enhanced performance on visuo‐perceptual tasks, like the Block Design task from the Wechsler Scales of Intelligence (Wechsler, 2008, 2014) or on the Embedded Figures Test (Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, & Karp, 1971), such strengths are invariably characterised as a by‐product of a deficit in higher‐order cognition (e.g. Frith & Happé's ‘weak central coherence’, 1994).”

    From Annual Research Review: Shifting from ‘normal science’ to neurodiversity in autism science (2022) · cites this paper as Frith & Happé, 1994

  • This suggests a concrete computational mechanism for the long-standing concept of weak central coherence, which postulates that processing of local details dominates perception in ASD at the expense of global integration.

    “Interestingly, this suggests a concrete computational mechanism for the long-standing concept of “weak central coherence,” which postulates that processing of local details dominates perception in ASD, at the expense of global integration of information (31, 32).”

    From Can Bayesian Theories of Autism Spectrum Disorder Help Improve Clinical Practice? (2016) · cites this paper as [31]

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

Authors
Frith, U., & Happé, F.
Venue
Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1994-04
Volume
50
Issue
1-3
Pages
115-132
ISSN
0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/0010-0277(94)90024-8
OpenAlex
W2037759571
Cited by
1,450
References
93
Citations by year
2026: 33 · 2025: 40 · 2024: 55 · 2023: 58 · 2022: 59 · 2021: 57 · 2020: 63 · 2019: 68 · 2018: 64 · 2017: 85 · 2016: 57 · 2015: 80 · 2014: 76 · 2013: 69 · 2012: 63
FWCI
3.24
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Autism Spectrum Disorder Research
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
Keywords
autism spectrum disorder, theory of mind, false belief tasks, central coherence, social cognition, imagination, communication
MeSH terms
Adult, Autistic Disorder, Child, Communication, Humans, Imagination, Intelligence, Neuropsychological Tests, Pattern Recognition, Visual, Psychological Theory, Socialization

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review