What Dilemma? Moral Evaluation Shapes Factual Belief
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Moral dilemmas—like the “trolley problem” or real-world examples like capital punishment—result from a conflict between consequentialist and deontological intuitions (i.e., whether ends justify means). The authors contend that people often resolve such moral conflict by aligning factual beliefs about consequences of acts with evaluations of the act’s inherent morality (i.e., morality independent of its consequences). In both artificial (Study 1) and real-world (Study 2) dilemmas, the more an act was deemed inherently immoral, the more it was seen as unlikely to produce beneficial consequences and likely to involve harmful costs. Coherence between moral evaluations and factual beliefs increased with greater moral conviction, self-proclaimed topical knowledge, and political conservatism (Study 2). Reading essays about the inherent morality or immorality of capital punishment (Study 3) changed beliefs about its costs and benefits, even though no information about consequences was supplied. Implications for moral reasoning and political conflict are discussed.
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Citations
Cites
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339 · Cited by 4,904
Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations.
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0015141 · Cited by 4,560
Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs
Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00214.x · Cited by 4,344
The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027 · Cited by 2,620 · cited 2×
“In the moral reasoning literature, there is a clear implicit assumption that individuals confronting moral dilemmas struggle their way to either a consequentialist or deontological conclusion, and then simply live with the unavoidable downside of their either-or decision (cf. Greene et al., 2004).”
BackgroundThinking the unthinkable: sacred values and taboo cognitions
Tetlock, P. E. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(03)00135-9 · Cited by 915 · cited 4×
“Others have posited that values can shape factual beliefs (e.g., Baron & Spranca, 1997; Kahan, 2010).”
InfluentialMoral Conviction: Another Contributor to Attitude Strength or Something More?
Skitka, L. J., Bauman, C. W., & Sargis, E. G. (2005) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.88.6.895 · Cited by 828 · cited 2×
“Research has shown that positions held with moral conviction are often experienced as objective, self-evident truths (Goodwin & Darley, 2008; Skitka et al., 2005; Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008), and part of this phenomenon may be the tendency to generate both deontological and consequentialist rationales for deeply h…”
BackgroundMOTIVATED SKEPTICISM IN THE EVALUATION OF POLITICAL BELIEFS (2006)
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Fixing the communications failure
Kahan, D. (2010) · Nature · doi:10.1038/463296a · Cited by 602 · cited 2×
“Others have posited that values can shape factual beliefs (e.g., Baron & Spranca, 1997; Kahan, 2010).”
BackgroundMethodPatterns of Moral Judgment Derive From Nonmoral Psychological Representations
Cushman, F., & Young, L. (2011) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1551-6709.2010.01167.x · Cited by 179 · cited 1×
“Our findings contribute to a growing body of research demonstrating that moral evaluations affect nonmoral judgments such as assessments of cause (Alicke, 2000; Cushman & Young, 2011), intention (Knobe, 2003, 2010), and control (Young & Phillips, 2011).”
Cited by
Ideology, motivated reasoning, and cognitive reflection
Kahan, D. M. (2013) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500005271 · Cited by 1,302
Rationalizing meat consumption. The 4Ns
Piazza, J., Ruby, M. B., Loughnan, S., Luong, M., Kulik, J., Watkins, H. M., & Seigerman, M. (2015) · Appetite · doi:10.1016/j.appet.2015.04.011 · Cited by 768
The Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by Redefining Harm
Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2018) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868317698288 · Cited by 659
Differences in negativity bias underlie variations in political ideology
Hibbing, J. R., Smith, K. B., & Alford, J. R. (2014) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x13001192 · Cited by 608
Solution aversion: On the relation between ideology and motivated disbelief.
Campbell, T. H., & Kay, A. C. (2014) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0037963 · Cited by 560
Metadata
- Authors
- Liu, B. S., & Ditto, P. H.
- Venue
- Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2012-08-15
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 316-323
- ISSN
- 1948-5506 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-5514
- OpenAlex
- W3125002384
- Cited by
- 124
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 5.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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