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"The lobbying strategy is to keep excise as low as possible" - tobacco industry excise taxation policy in Ukraine
Open accessAbstract
BACKGROUND: Tobacco taxes are one of the most effective ways to reduce tobacco use. Transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) claim they wish to develop and secure excise systems that benefit both governments and the profitability of the companies themselves. The objective of the paper is to use the case of Ukraine, with its inconsistent history of excise tax changes in 1992-2008, to explore tobacco industry taxation strategies and tactics, and their implications for governmental revenues. METHODS: Details of tobacco industry policy on tobacco taxation in Ukraine were obtained by searching tobacco industry internal documents and various published reports. RESULTS: Even before entering the market in Ukraine, TTCs had made efforts to change the excise system in the country. In 1993-1994, TTCs lobbied the Ukrainian Government, and succeeded in achieving a lowering in tobacco tax. This, however, did not produce revenue increase they promised the Government. In 1996-1998, Ukrainian authorities increased excise several times, ignoring the wishes of TTCs, caused significant growth in revenue. Due to TTCs lobbying activities in 1999-2007 the tax increases were very moderate and it resulted in increased tobacco consumption in Ukraine. In 2008, despite the TTCs position, excise rates were increased twice and it was very beneficial for revenues. CONCLUSIONS: The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control includes provisions both on tobacco taxation policy and on protection of public health policy from vested interests of tobacco industry. This paper provides arguments why tobacco taxation policy should also be protected from vested interests of tobacco industry. TTCs taxation strategy appears to be consistent: keep excise as low as possible. Apparent conflicts between TTCs concerning tax structures often hide their real aim to change tax structures for competing interests without increasing total tax incidence. Governments, that aim to reduce levels of tobacco use, should not allow tobacco companies to influence the development and implementation of tobacco taxation policy.
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Despite tax increases, Ukraine ranks among the bottom five countries for cigarette prices in Europe.
“Despite these increases, Ukraine ranks among the bottom five countries for cigarette prices in Europe.13–16”
From Seven-year tobacco tax plan in Ukraine: a case study of the actors, tactics and factors motivating policy passage (2022) · cites this paper as [15]
The Results sections on 1995–1998 and 2008 report excise-tax increases, and the 2008 section says Ukrainian cigarette prices were below Russia’s. Our copy does not establish that Ukraine ranked among Europe’s five lowest-priced countries. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredTobacco companies have historically maintained low prices in Ukraine by undercutting each other, lobbying against tobacco tax increases, and absorbing small tax increases rather than passing them on to consumers.
“Tobacco companies have historically maintained low prices in Ukraine by undercutting each other to keep prices low, lobbying against legislation increasing tobacco taxes, and absorbing small tax increases rather than passing them on to consumers.13–15”
From Seven-year tobacco tax plan in Ukraine: a case study of the actors, tactics and factors motivating policy passage (2022) · cites this paper as [15]
The Results (1999–2000 and 2000–2007; page numbers unavailable) document lobbying against tax increases and report that inflation-adjusted cigarette prices fell while tobacco companies pursued competitive interests. The paper does not establish that companies undercut one another on price or absorbed small tax increases instead of passing them on to consumers. (LLM, conf=0.86)
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Research works printed but not linked: 15
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Weiger, C., Hoe, C., & Cohen, J. E. (2022) · BMJ Open · doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2021-049833 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Krasovsky, K. S.
- Corresponding author
- Krasovsky, Konstantin S
- Venue
- Tobacco Induced Diseases
- Publisher
- E.U. European Publishing
- Published
- 2010
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 10
- ISSN
- 1617-9625 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC2936872
- OpenAlex
- W2147557105
- Cited by
- 19
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 2 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 2 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 3.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Tobacco Induced Diseases (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Global Public Health Policies and Epidemiology
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Smoking Behavior and Cessation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Fiscal Studies
- Keywords
- tobacco industry lobbying, transnational tobacco companies, tobacco taxation policy, tobacco tax revenue, tobacco use, vested interests, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, tobacco control, Ukraine
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