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Cognitive biases associated with medical decisions: a systematic review

Open access
Saposnik, Gustavo, Redelmeier, Donald, Ruff, Christian C., Tobler, Philippe N. · 2016 · BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making

Abstract

BACKGROUND: Cognitive biases and personality traits (aversion to risk or ambiguity) may lead to diagnostic inaccuracies and medical errors resulting in mismanagement or inadequate utilization of resources. We conducted a systematic review with four objectives: 1) to identify the most common cognitive biases, 2) to evaluate the influence of cognitive biases on diagnostic accuracy or management errors, 3) to determine their impact on patient outcomes, and 4) to identify literature gaps. METHODS: We searched MEDLINE and the Cochrane Library databases for relevant articles on cognitive biases from 1980 to May 2015. We included studies conducted in physicians that evaluated at least one cognitive factor using case-vignettes or real scenarios and reported an associated outcome written in English. Data quality was assessed by the Newcastle-Ottawa scale. Among 114 publications, 20 studies comprising 6810 physicians met the inclusion criteria. Nineteen cognitive biases were identified. RESULTS: All studies found at least one cognitive bias or personality trait to affect physicians. Overconfidence, lower tolerance to risk, the anchoring effect, and information and availability biases were associated with diagnostic inaccuracies in 36.5 to 77 % of case-scenarios. Five out of seven (71.4 %) studies showed an association between cognitive biases and therapeutic or management errors. Of two (10 %) studies evaluating the impact of cognitive biases or personality traits on patient outcomes, only one showed that higher tolerance to ambiguity was associated with increased medical complications (9.7 % vs 6.5 %; p = .004). Most studies (60 %) targeted cognitive biases in diagnostic tasks, fewer focused on treatment or management (35 %) and on prognosis (10 %). Literature gaps include potentially relevant biases (e.g. aggregate bias, feedback sanction, hindsight bias) not investigated in the included studies. Moreover, only five (25 %) studies used clinical guidelines as the framework to determine diagnostic or treatment errors. Most studies (n = 12, 60 %) were classified as low quality. CONCLUSIONS: Overconfidence, the anchoring effect, information and availability bias, and tolerance to risk may be associated with diagnostic inaccuracies or suboptimal management. More comprehensive studies are needed to determine the prevalence of cognitive biases and personality traits and their potential impact on physicians' decisions, medical errors, and patient outcomes.

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Fig. 1 A model for diagnostic reasoning based on dual-process theory (from Ely et al. with permission).[9] System 1 thinking can be influenced by multiple factors, many of them subconscious (emotional polarization toward the patient, recent experience with the diagnosis being considered, specific cognitive or affective biases), and is therefore represented with multiple channels, whereas system 2 processes are, in a given instance, single-channeled and linear. System 2 overrides system 1 (executive override) when physicians take a time-out to reflect on their thinking, possibly with the help of checklists. In contrast, system 1 may irrationally override system 2 when physicians insist on going their own way (e.g., ignoring evidence-based clinical decision rules that can usually outperform them). Notes: Dysrationalia denotes the inability to think rationally despite adequate intelligence. “Calibration” denotes the degree to which the perceived and actual diagnostic accuracy correspond
Fig. 1 A model for diagnostic reasoning based on dual-process theory (from Ely et al. with permission).[9] System 1 thinking can be influenced by multiple factors, many of them subconscious (emotional polarization toward the patient, recent experience with the diagnosis being considered, specific cognitive or affective biases), and is therefore represented with multiple channels, whereas system 2 processes are, in a given instance, single-channeled and linear. System 2 overrides system 1 (executive override) when physicians take a time-out to reflect on their thinking, possibly with the help of checklists. In contrast, system 1 may irrationally override system 2 when physicians insist on going their own way (e.g., ignoring evidence-based clinical decision rules that can usually outperform them). Notes: Dysrationalia denotes the inability to think rationally despite adequate intelligence. “Calibration” denotes the degree to which the perceived and actual diagnostic accuracy correspondCC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 2 PRISMA flow diagram
Fig. 2 PRISMA flow diagramCC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 3 Prevalence of most common cognitive biases as reported by different studies. Numbers represent percentages reflecting the frequency of the cognitive factor/bias. Panel a represent the prevalence of the framing effect. Panel b represent the prevalence of prevalence of tolerance to risk and ambiguity. Panel c represents the prevalence of overconfidence. Overall, overconfidence and low tolerance to risk or ambiguity were found in 50-70 % of participants, whereas a wide variation was found for the framing effect
Fig. 3 Prevalence of most common cognitive biases as reported by different studies. Numbers represent percentages reflecting the frequency of the cognitive factor/bias. Panel a represent the prevalence of the framing effect. Panel b represent the prevalence of prevalence of tolerance to risk and ambiguity. Panel c represents the prevalence of overconfidence. Overall, overconfidence and low tolerance to risk or ambiguity were found in 50-70 % of participants, whereas a wide variation was found for the framing effectCC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 4 Prevalence of cognitive biases in the top three most comprehensive studies [39, 50, 52] Numbers represent percentages reflecting the frequency of the cognitive bias. Note the wide variation in the prevalence of cognitive biases across studies
Fig. 4 Prevalence of cognitive biases in the top three most comprehensive studies [39, 50, 52] Numbers represent percentages reflecting the frequency of the cognitive bias. Note the wide variation in the prevalence of cognitive biases across studiesCC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 5 Outcome measures of studies evaluating cognitive biases. Numbers represent percentages. Total number of studies = 20. Note that 30 % of studies are descriptive and 35 % target diagnostic accuracy. Only few studies evaluated medical management, treatment, hospitalization or prognosis
Fig. 5 Outcome measures of studies evaluating cognitive biases. Numbers represent percentages. Total number of studies = 20. Note that 30 % of studies are descriptive and 35 % target diagnostic accuracy. Only few studies evaluated medical management, treatment, hospitalization or prognosisCC BY · PubMed Central

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Metadata

Authors
Saposnik, G., Redelmeier, D., Ruff, C. C., & Tobler, P. N.
Affiliations
  • St. Michael's Hospital (CA)
  • Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences (CA)
  • University of Zurich (CH)
Corresponding author
Saposnik, Gustavo
Venue
BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making
Published
2016-11-03
Volume
16
Issue
1
Pages
138-138
ISSN
1472-6947 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2548421507
Cited by
1,001
References
74
Citations by year
2026: 141 · 2025: 111 · 2024: 118 · 2023: 97 · 2022: 158 · 2021: 120 · 2020: 95 · 2019: 83 · 2018: 55 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 1
FWCI
8.96
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (acceptedVersion, cc-by)
  • TSpace (University of Toronto) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich)
Funders
  • Swiss National Science Foundation (CRSII3_141965)
  • Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada (NA)
Topics
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Patient Safety and Medication Errors
Keywords
cognitive biases, clinical decision-making, diagnostic errors, medical errors, overconfidence, anchoring effect, availability bias, information bias, risk aversion, ambiguity tolerance, personality traits, patient outcomes, physician decision-making
MeSH terms
Clinical Decision-Making, Humans, Personality, Physicians, Thinking

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Cognitive biases associated with medical decisions: a systematic review. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1186/s12911-016-0377-1
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Saposnik, G., Redelmeier, D., Ruff, C. C., & Tobler, P. N. (2016). Cognitive biases associated with medical decisions: a systematic review. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12911-016-0377-1

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