The Role of Context in the Communication of Uncertain Beliefs
The DOI matches its OpenAlex record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Most decisions require an evaluation of the likelihood of events on which outcomes depend. A common mode of judgment under uncertainty is the interpretation of statements of belief expressed by others. Most previous research on the communication of uncertainty has focused on the interpretation and use of quantitative versus qualitative expressions (e.g., "90% chance" vs. "extremely likely"); in addition, a handful of articles have addressed the effects of contextual base rates on the interpretation of expressed beliefs. In this article we argue that the social, informational, motivational, and discourse context in which beliefs are constructed and statements are formulated provides myriad additional cues that influence what is expressed by speakers and what is understood by listeners. We advance a framework for organizing the six sources of information on which listeners rely (in addition to the denotation of the speaker's words) when updating beliefs under uncertainty: (a) the listener's prior beliefs and assumptions about the world; (b) the listener's interpretation of the social and informational context in which the speaker's beliefs were formed; (c) the listener's evaluation of the speaker's credibility and judgmental tendencies; (d) the listener's interpretation of the social and motivational context in which the statement was made; (e) the listener's understanding of information conveyed directly and indirectly by the speaker; and (f) the listener's interpretation of the social and discourse context in which the statement was embedded. Throughout this article we cite relevant research from decision making and social psychology, as well as examples from the risk communication literature. We conclude with some comments on the transmission of uncertain beliefs in groups, followed by a general discussion.
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Citations
Cites
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“…on listeners being aware of the identity of the source before receiving the message (Sternthal, Dholakia, & Leavitt, 1978) can diminish over time (Hovland & Weiss, 1951) and can be reversed if the listener is favorably 62 FOX AND IRWIN predisposed to the conclusion in question (Sternthal et al.,…”
BackgroundCalibration of probabilities: the state of the art to 1980
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Cited by
Communication and Uncertainty Management
Brashers, D. E. (2001) · Journal of Communication · doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2001.tb02892.x · Cited by 1,407
Lipkus, I. M. (2007) · Medical Decision Making · doi:10.1177/0272989x07307271 · Cited by 771
Representational gaps, information processing, and conflict in functionally diverse teams
Cronin, M. A., & Weingart, L. R. (2007) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2007.25275511 · Cited by 646
Ignorance is bliss: Or seven reasons not to use uncertainty analysis
Pappenberger, F., & Beven, K. J. (2006) · Water Resources Research · doi:10.1029/2005wr004820 · Cited by 555
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fox, C. R., & Irwin, J. R.
- Venue
- Basic and Applied Social Psychology
- Publisher
- Taylor & Francis
- Published
- 1998-01-01
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57-70
- ISSN
- 0197-3533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2163165455
- Cited by
- 75
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 1.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.