Predictions, perception, and a sense of self
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In recent years there has been a paradigm shift in theoretical neuroscience in which the brain-as a passive processor of sensory information-is now considered an active organ of inference, generating predictions and hypotheses about the causes of its sensations. In this commentary, we try to convey the basic ideas behind this perspective, describe their neurophysiologic underpinnings, and highlight the potential importance of this formulation for clinical neuroscience. The formalism it provides-and the implementation of active inference in the brain-may have the potential to reveal aspects of functional neuroanatomy that are compromised in conditions ranging from Parkinson disease to schizophrenia. In particular, many neurologic and neuropsychiatric conditions may be understandable in terms of a failure to modulate the postsynaptic gain of neuronal populations reporting prediction errors during action and perception. From the perspective of the predictive brain, this represents a failure to encode the precision of-or confidence in-sensory information. We propose that the predictive or inferential perspective on brain function offers novel insights into brain diseases.
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Cites
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924 · cited 1×
“Put simply, ascending precision-weighted prediction errors report what is newsworthy in the incoming signal—not the sensory signal per se.(1) The cortex is therefore more of a (salient) error detector than a feature detector.”
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Canonical Microcircuits for Predictive Coding
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Self-citationError Correction, Sensory Prediction, and Adaptation in Motor Control
Shadmehr, R., Smith, M. A., & Krakauer, J. W. (2010) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev-neuro-060909-153135 · Cited by 1,869 · cited 1×
“The ensuing hierarchical control accommodates real-time adjustment/correction of the movement to nuance the fulfillment of descending proprioceptive predictions or corticospinal motor commands—or to update these commands.(15,16) Neurophysiologically, these updates may occur very quickly (each ;150 ms, i.”
BackgroundInteroceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self
Seth, A. K. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007 · Cited by 1,816 · cited 1×
“Crucially, interoceptive inference may underlie emotions and feelings: our “sentient self” (the material me) would therefore be constituted by successive interoceptive predictions, which are thought to be updated within the insula (and anterior cingulate cortex).(14) This model of interoception as a predictive process…”
ResultAttention, uncertainty, and free-energy
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On the computational architecture of the neocortex: II The role of cortico-cortical loops
Mumford, D. (1992) · Biological Cybernetics · doi:10.1007/bf00198477 · Cited by 1,074 · cited 2×
“In other words, generative models have to be formed (via experience-dependent plasticity) to enable perceptual inference or synthesis.(10) This acquisition—through the associative synaptic plasticity of recurrent connections in cortical hierarchies—underlies perceptual learning.”
BackgroundHierarchical Models in the Brain
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Cited by
Trusting Automation: Designing for Responsivity and Resilience
Chiou, E. K., & Lee, J. D. (2023) · Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society · doi:10.1177/00187208211009995 · Cited by 301
Cerebellum, Predictions and Errors
Popa, L. S., & Ebner, T. J. (2019) · Frontiers in Cellular Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fncel.2018.00524 · Cited by 191
A perceptual inference mechanism for hallucinations linked to striatal dopamine
Cassidy, C. M., Balsam, P. D., Weinstein, J. J., Rosengard, R. J., Slifstein, M., Daw, N. D., Abi-Dargham, A., & Horga, G. (2018) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2017.12.059 · Cited by 176
“Perception is an inherently subjective process that is biased by beliefs acquired through experience [1].”
BackgroundDo, K. Q., Cuenod, M., & Hensch, T. K. (2015) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbv065 · Cited by 158
(2018) · UCL Discovery (University College London) · Cited by 145
Metadata
- Authors
- Picard, F., & Friston, K.
- Venue
- Neurology
- Published
- 2014-09-16
- Volume
- 83
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 1112-1118
- ISSN
- 0028-3878 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-632X
- OpenAlex
- W2128328481
- Cited by
- 118
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 4.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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