The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Verbal Disputes
Open accessAbstract
The philosophical interest of verbal disputes is twofold. First, they play a key role in philosophical method. Many philosophical disagreements are at least partly verbal, and almost every philosophical dispute has been diagnosed as verbal at some point. Here we can see the diagnosis of verbal disputes as a tool for philosophical progress. Second, they are interesting as a subject matter for first-order philosophy. Reflection on the existence and nature of verbal disputes can reveal something about the nature of concepts, language, and meaning. In this article I first characterize verbal disputes, spell out a method for isolating and resolving them, and draw out conclusions for philosophical methodology. I then use the framework to draw out consequences in first-order philosophy. In particular, I argue that the analysis of verbal disputes can be used to support the existence of a distinctive sort of primitive concept and that it can be used to reconstruct a version of an analytic/synthetic distinction, where both are characterized in dialectical terms alone.
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Cites
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism
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Consciousness Explained?: A Commentary on Dennett's Consciousness Explained
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Self-citationBeyond "justification": dimensions of epistemic evaluation
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-0858 · Cited by 485
Cited by
Why Isn't There More Progress in Philosophy?
Chalmers, D. J. (2015) · Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0031819114000436 · Cited by 199
Self-citationVan Leeuwen, N., & Lombrozo, T. (2023) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.13245 · Cited by 32
Disagreement & classification in comparative cognitive science
Boyle, A. (2024) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12480 · Cited by 23
Metadata
- Authors
- Chalmers, D. J.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- Duke University Press
- Published
- 2011-10-01
- Volume
- 120
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 515-566
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-1470
- OpenAlex
- W4250547535
- Cited by
- 360
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 92.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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