The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence
Abstract
Much of the empirical work and the conceptual discussion of the impact of institutions on economic development either implicitly or explicitly assumes that institutions persist. Although Acemoglu et al. (2001) provide evidence that constraints on the executive persist, many aspects of institutions change frequently. Less-developed countries cycle between democracy and dictatorship and often change their constitutions. Relatedly, while the current economic problems in Latin America are often traced back to colonial times (Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, 1997; Acemoglu et al., 2002), the specific institutions that once underpinned the colonial economy, such as the encomienda, the mita, or slavery, vanished long ago. These observations suggest that we need to develop a framework in which changes in certain dimensions of institutions are consistent with overall institutional persistence. In this paper, we make an attempt to highlight some important mechanisms for understanding simultaneous change and persistence in institutions. Institutional persistence, in this context, refers to the persistence of a cluster of economic institutions, such as the extent of enforcement of property rights for a broad cross section of society (Acemoglu et al., 2001). Such lack of property rights enforcement may be driven by quite different specific institutions, e.g., risk of expropriation, entry barriers, or economic systems such as serfdom or slavery. In turn, these different specific economic institutions may exist under different political institutions, including dictatorships, absolutist monarchies, oligarchies, and corrupt or even populist democracies. Given this rich array of possibilities, a useful framework must specify which aspects of institutions can change, which others have a tendency to persist in equilibrium, and how the persistence of certain types of institutions could have lasting effects on economic outcomes. In this paper, we provide a simple model of the coexistence of change and persistence in institutions. First we describe some existing approaches to the persistence of social arrangements, as well as the essence of the mechanism we propose. Next, we illustrate the key issues using the experience of the southern United States, and last we provide a simple model that formalizes the main mechanism in the paper. We conclude by discussing a complementary mechanism to the one presented in this paper.
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Citations
Cites
The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.5.1369 · Cited by 8,517 · cited 2×
“Institutional persistence, in this context, refers to the persistence of a cluster of economic institutions, such as the extent of enforcement of property rights for a broad cross section of society (Acemoglu et al., 2001).”
BackgroundSelf-citationCompeting Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events
Arthur, W. B. (1989) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234208 · Cited by 7,489
The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Reply
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.6.3077 · Cited by 6,047
Self-citationEconomic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810
Self-citationAcemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302320935025 · Cited by 2,730
Self-citationAcemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. (2001) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8460 · Cited by 2,494
Self-citationPolitical Parties : A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy
Michels, R. (1911) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,562
Persistence of Power, Elites and InstitutionsPreprint
Acemoğlu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.888187 · Cited by 1,314
Self-citationIndividual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions
Mezzetti, C., & Young, H. P. (1999) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061165 · Cited by 851
The Strange Career of Jim Crow.
Richards, E. S., & Woodward, C. V. (1955) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2092589 · Cited by 741
Cited by
THE CASE FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTION: PLACE‐BASED VERSUS PLACE‐NEUTRAL APPROACHES*
Barca, F., McCann, P., & Rodríguez‐Pose, A. (2012) · Journal of Regional Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9787.2011.00756.x · Cited by 1,600
Do Institutions Matter for Regional Development?
Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2013) · Regional Studies · doi:10.1080/00343404.2012.748978 · Cited by 1,225
The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya
Burgess, R., Jedwab, R., Miguel, E., Morjaria, A., & Padró i Miquel, G. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20131031 · Cited by 648
The Role of Institutions in Growth and Development
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2010) · Review of Economics and Institutions · doi:10.5202/rei.v1i2.14 · Cited by 460
Self-citationHAS DEMOCRATIZATION REDUCED INFANT MORTALITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA? EVIDENCE FROM MICRO DATA
Kudamatsu, M. (2012) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01092.x · Cited by 373
Metadata
- Authors
- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2006-04-01
- Volume
- 96
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 325-330
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1968481313
- Cited by
- 512
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 42.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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