The DOI matches its Crossref record; 76 of the 76 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Role of Institutions in Growth and Development
Abstract
In this paper we argue that the main determinant of differences in prosperity across countries are differences in economic institutions. To solve the problem of development will entail reforming these institutions. Unfortunately, this is difficult because economic institutions are collective choices that are the outcome of a political process. The economic institutions of a society depend on the nature of political institutions and the distribution of political power in society. As yet, we only have a highly preliminary understanding of the factors that lead a society into a political equilibrium which supports good economic institutions. However, it is clear that it is the political nature of an institutional equilibrium that makes it very difficult to reform economic institutions. We illustrate this with a series of pitfalls of institutional reforms. Our analysis reveals challenges for those who would wish to solve the problem of development and poverty. That such challenges exist is hardly surprising and we believe that the main reason for such challenges is the forces we have outlined in this paper. Better development policy will only come when we recognize this and understand these forces better. Nevertheless, some countries do undergo political transitions, reform their institutions, and move onto more successful paths of economic development. We also can learn a lot from these success stories.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Munger, M. C., & North, D. C. (1991) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1060065 · Cited by 24,871
Mauro, P. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946696 · Cited by 8,820
The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Reply
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.6.3077 · Cited by 6,047
Self-citationINSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS‐COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1995) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1995.tb00111.x · Cited by 5,084
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810
Self-citationStructure and Change in Economic History
George, P., & North, D. C. (1983) · The Canadian Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/135165 · Cited by 4,564
Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation
Evans, P. B. (1995) · doi:10.1515/9781400821723 · Cited by 4,238
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302753399436 · Cited by 3,956 · cited 1×
“Knack and Keefer (1995), for instance, looked at measures of property rights enforcement compiled by international business organizations, Mauro (1995) looked at measures of corruption, and Djankov et al. (2002) compiled measures of entry barriers across countries.”
Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. (2004) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10481 · Cited by 3,101
Self-citationAcemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. (2001) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8460 · Cited by 2,494
Self-citation
Cited by
Innovation policy: what, why, and how
Edler, J., & Fagerberg, J. (2017) · Oxford Review of Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/oxrep/grx001 · Cited by 733
Anti-corruption: the indirect ‘big bang’ approach
Rothstein, B. (2011) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692291003607834 · Cited by 351
Explaining the welfare state: power resources vs. the Quality of Government
Rothstein, B., Samanni, M., & Teorell, J. (2012) · European Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s1755773911000051 · Cited by 186
Fertility in High-Income Countries: Trends, Patterns, Determinants, and Consequences
Bloom, D. E., Kuhn, M., & Prettner, K. (2024) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-081523-013750 · Cited by 64
Fertility in High-Income Countries: Trends, Patterns, Determinants, and Consequences
Bloom, D. E., Kuhn, M., & Prettner, K. (2023) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4597716 · Cited by 9
Metadata
- Authors
- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J.
- Venue
- Review of Economics and Institutions
- Published
- 2010-10-01
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 2
- ISSN
- 2038-1379 (ISSN-L)
- 2038-1344
- OpenAlex
- W2042674091
- Cited by
- 460
- References
- 76
- FWCI
- 34.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Role of Institutions in Growth and Development. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.5202/rei.v1i2.14
- The paper
- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2010). The Role of Institutions in Growth and Development. Review of Economics and Institutions. https://doi.org/10.5202/rei.v1i2.14
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.