The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization
Abstract
According to the terms-of-trade theory, governments use trade agreements to escape from a terms-of-trade-driven prisoner's dilemma. We use the terms-of-trade theory to develop a relationship that predicts negotiated tariff levels on the basis of pre-negotiation data: tariffs, import volumes and prices, and trade elasticities. We then confront this predicted relationship with data on the outcomes of tariff negotiations associated with the accession of new members to the World Trade Organization. We find strong and robust support for the central predictions of the terms-of-trade theory in the observed pattern of negotiated tariff cuts. (JEL F11, F13)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Journal of economic literature
Armstrong, J. S. (1996) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(96)88197-0 · Cited by 9,923
(2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.i · Cited by 6,810
An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Effects of Aggregate Variables on Micro Units
Moulton, B. R. (1990) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/2109724 · Cited by 2,630
Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?
Rose, A. K. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282804322970724 · Cited by 1,481
Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.215 · Cited by 1,022
Self-citationEstimating Trade Restrictiveness Indices
Looi Kee, H., Nicita, A., & Olarreaga, M. (2009) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02209.x · Cited by 1,018
The WTO promotes trade, strongly but unevenly
Subramanian, A., & Wei, S.-J. (2007) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.07.007 · Cited by 866
Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation
Goldberg, P. K., & Maggi, G. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.5.1135 · Cited by 854
Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation
Johnson, H. G. (1953) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296006 · Cited by 666
The Political Economy of the World Trading System: The WTO and Beyond
Hoekman, B. M., & Kostecki, M. M. (2009) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199553761.001.0001 · Cited by 627
The Economics of the World Trading System
Conway, P., Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. (2004) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/4135340 · Cited by 526
Self-citationOptimum Tariffs and Retaliation
Johnson, H. G. (1973) · Readings in Welfare Economics · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15492-0_9 · Cited by 475
Optimal Tariffs and Market Power: The Evidence
Broda, C., Limão, N., & Weinstein, D. E. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.5.2032 · Cited by 448
The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation
Maggi, G. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.190 · Cited by 412
Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Comment
Tomz, M., Goldstein, J. L., & Rivers, D. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.5.2005 · Cited by 323
A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements
Maggi, G., & Rodríguez-Clare, A. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.4.1374 · Cited by 316
Firearms and violence: a critical review
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-2523 · Cited by 306
Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts
Horn, H., Maggi, G., & Staiger, R. W. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.1.394 · Cited by 301
Self-citationDo WTO members have more liberal trade policy?
Rose, A. K. (2004) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(03)00071-0 · Cited by 262
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON NEGOTIATED TARIFF ADJUSTMENTS
MAYER, W. (1981) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041494 · Cited by 256
How Regional Blocs Affect Excluded Countries: The Price Effects of MERCOSUR
Chang, W., & Winters, L. A. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260344515 · Cited by 253
On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement
Bown, C. P. (2004) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/0034653041811680 · Cited by 234
Limão, N. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.3.896 · Cited by 231
Why Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About
Krugman, P. (1997) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 198
Does Regionalism Affect Trade Liberalization toward NonMembers?*
Estevadeordal, A., Freund, C., & Ornelas, E. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.4.1531 · Cited by 196
Anderson, J. E., & van Wincoop, E. (2001) · Brookings Trade Forum · doi:10.1353/btf.2001.0002 · Cited by 188
Does Regionalism Affect Trade Liberalization Toward Non-Members?
Estevadeordal, A., Freund, C., & Ornelas, E. (2008) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-4751 · Cited by 179
Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT/WTO
Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (2004) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(03)00054-0 · Cited by 165
Self-citationKaracaovali, B., & Limão, N. (2008) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2007.07.003 · Cited by 165
Offshoring and the Role of Trade Agreements
Antràs, P., & Staiger, R. W. (2008) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w14285 · Cited by 147
Self-citationDoes the WTO Make Trade More Stable?
Rose, A. K. (2005) · Open Economies Review · doi:10.1007/s11079-005-5329-9 · Cited by 127
Bagwell, K. W., & Staiger, R. W. (2005) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/431782 · Cited by 124
Self-citationReciprocity, non-discrimination and preferential agreements in the multilateral trading system
Bagwell, K. W., & Staiger, R. W. (2001) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/s0176-2680(01)00029-5 · Cited by 118
Self-citationDo Gatt Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?
Staiger, R. W., & Tabellini, G. (1999) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/1468-0343.00055 · Cited by 115
Self-citationPolicy externalities: How US antidumping affects Japanese exports to the EU
Bown, C. P., & Crowley, M. A. (2006) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.12.004 · Cited by 112
Trade disputes and the implementation of protection under the GATT: an empirical assessment
Bown, C. P. (2003) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(03)00053-9 · Cited by 111
Regional integration and import prices: an empirical investigation
Winters, L. A., & Chang, W. (2000) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(99)00010-0 · Cited by 99
Bown, C. P. (2002) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/1468-0343.00109 · Cited by 98
Trade policy under the GATT/WTO: empirical evidence of the equal treatment rule
Bown, C. P. (2004) · Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économique · doi:10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.00243.x · Cited by 63
Do countries free ride on MFN?
Ludema, R. D., & Mayda, A. M. (2008) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2008.08.004 · Cited by 50
Self-Enforcing International Agreements and Domestic Policy CredibilityPreprint
Conconi, P., & Perroni, C. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.429964 · Cited by 20
Backward Stealing and Forward Manipulation in the WTO
Bagwell, K. W., & Staiger, R. W. (2004) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10420 · Cited by 20
Self-citationAre WTO Tari Negotiations Reciprocal? An Analysis of Tari Liberalization
Shirono, K. (2004) · Cited by 10
Trade Barriers as Bargaining Outcomes
Gawande, K., & Li, H. (2006) · World Economy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00793.x · Cited by 8
Cited by
Two-Way Fixed Effects Estimators with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
de Chaisemartin, C., & D’Haultfœuille, X. (2020) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20181169 · Cited by 5,031
Policy Uncertainty, Trade, and Welfare: Theory and Evidence for China and the United States
Handley, K., & Limão, N. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20141419 · Cited by 988
Optimal Tariffs and Market Power: The Evidence
Broda, C., Limão, N., & Weinstein, D. E. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.5.2032 · Cited by 448
Baier, S. L., Yotov, Y. V., & Zylkin, T. (2019) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2018.11.002 · Cited by 391
The Economic Impacts of the US–China Trade War
Fajgelbaum, P. D., & Khandelwal, A. K. (2022) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-051420-110410 · Cited by 388
Metadata
- Authors
- Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2011-06-01
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1238-1273
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123694014
- Cited by
- 258
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 61.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.