Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We study the design of randomized controlled experiments when outcomes are significantly affected by experimental subjects' unobserved effort expenditure. While standard randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are internally consistent, the unobservability of effort compromises external validity. We approach trial design as a principal-agent problem and show that natural extensions of RCTs—which we call selective trials—can help improve external validity. In particular, selective trials can disentangle the effects of treatment, effort, and the interaction of treatment and effort. Moreover, they can help identify when treatment effects are affected by erroneous beliefs and inappropriate effort expenditure.(JEL C90, D82)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Identification of Causal Effects Using Instrumental Variables
Angrist, J. D., Imbens, G. W., & Rubin, D. B. (1996) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1996.10476902 · Cited by 4,230
Identification and estimation of local average treatment effects
Imbens, G. W., & Angrist, J. D. (1994) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951620 · Cited by 4,101
Structural Equations, Treatment Effects, and Econometric Policy Evaluation1
Heckman, J. J., & Vytlacil, E. (2005) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00594.x · Cited by 1,220
Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School
Duflo, E., Hanna, R., & Ryan, S. P. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.4.1241 · Cited by 928
Financial Incentive–Based Approaches for Weight Loss: A Randomized Trial
Volpp, K. G., John, L. K., Troxel, A. B., Norton, L., Fassbender, J., & Loewenstein, G. (2008) · JAMA · doi:10.1001/jama.2008.804 · Cited by 923
A Randomized, Controlled Trial of Financial Incentives for Smoking Cessation
Volpp, K. G., Troxel, A. B., Pauly, M. V., Glick, H. A., Puig, A., Asch, D. A., Galvin, R., Zhu, J., Wan, F., DeGuzman, J., et al. (2009) · New England Journal of Medicine · doi:10.1056/nejmsa0806819 · Cited by 836
Free Distribution or Cost-Sharing? Evidence from a Randomized Malaria Prevention Experiment*
Cohen, J., & Dupas, P. (2010) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2010.125.1.1 · Cited by 762
Gertler, P. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828041302109 · Cited by 703
A two-armed bandit theory of market pricing
Rothschild, M. (1974) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(74)90066-0 · Cited by 618
The Nonparametric Identification of Treatment Effects in Duration Models
Abbring, J. H., & van den Berg, G. J. (2003) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00456 · Cited by 616
Cited by
Instruments, Randomization, and Learning about Development
Deaton, A. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.2.424 · Cited by 1,286
Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School
Duflo, E., Hanna, R., & Ryan, S. P. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.4.1241 · Cited by 928
Isoni, A., Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.2.991 · Cited by 612
Measuring and Bounding Experimenter Demand
de Quidt, J., Haushofer, J., & Roth, C. (2018) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20171330 · Cited by 568
Can Higher Prices Stimulate Product Use? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Zambia
Ashraf, N., Berry, J., & Shapiro, J. M. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.5.2383 · Cited by 446
Metadata
- Authors
- Chassang, S., Padró i Miquel, G., & Snowberg, E.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2012-06-01
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1279-1309
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124117404
- Cited by
- 153
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 15.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.102.4.1279
- The paper
- Chassang, S., Padró i Miquel, G., & Snowberg, E. (2012). Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.4.1279
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.