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Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices
Open accessAbstract
Many important issues in business-to-business markets involve price discrimination and negotiated prices, situations where theoretical predictions are ambiguous. This paper uses new panel data on buyer-supplier transfers and a structural model to empirically analyze bargaining and price discrimination in a medical device market. While many phenomena that restrict different prices to different buyers are suggested as ways to decrease hospital costs (e.g., mergers, group purchasing organizations, and transparency), I find that: (i) more uniform pricing works against hospitals by softening competition; and (ii) results depend ultimately on a previously unexplored bargaining effect. (JEL C78, L13, L14, L64)
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Cited by
Mergers When Prices Are Negotiated: Evidence from the Hospital Industry
Gowrisankaran, G., Nevo, A., & Town, R. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20130223 · Cited by 393
The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets
Gaynor, M., Ho, K., & Town, R. J. (2015) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.53.2.235 · Cited by 349
Insurer Competition in Health Care Markets
Ho, K., & Lee, R. (2013) · Econometrica · doi:10.3386/w19401 · Cited by 296
Quantitative Analysis of Multi-Party Tariff Negotiations
Bagwell, K., Staiger, R., & Yurukoglu, A. (2018) · doi:10.3386/w24273 · Cited by 28
Metadata
- Authors
- Grennan, M.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2013-02-01
- Volume
- 103
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 145-177
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2096094825
- Cited by
- 323
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 41.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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