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Consumption Risk-Sharing in Social Networks
Open accessAbstract
We develop a model in which connections between individuals serve as social collateral to enforce informal insurance payments. We show that: (i) The degree of insurance is governed by the expansiveness of the network, measured with the per capita number of connections that groups have with the rest of the community. “Two-dimensional” networks—like real-world networks in Peruvian villages—are sufficiently expansive to allow very good risk-sharing. (ii) In second-best arrangements, insurance is local: agents fully share shocks within, but imperfectly between endogenously emerging risk-sharing groups. We also discuss how endogenous social collateral affects our results. (JEL D85, G22, O15, O17, Z13)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ambrus, A., Mobius, M., & Szeidl, A.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2014-01-01
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 149-182
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2155538473
- Cited by
- 313
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 21.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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