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Cited by 265

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

How Does Risk Selection Respond to Risk Adjustment? New Evidence from the Medicare Advantage Program

Open access
Brown, Jason, Duggan, Mark, Kuziemko, Ilyana, Woolston, William·2014·American Economic Review

Abstract

To combat adverse selection, governments increasingly base payments to health plans and providers on enrollees' scores from risk-adjustment formulae. In 2004, Medicare began to risk-adjust capitation payments to private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans to reduce selection-driven overpayments. But because the variance of medical costs increases with the predicted mean, incentivizing enrollment of individuals with higher scores can increase the scope for enrolling “overpriced” individuals with costs significantly below the formula's prediction. Indeed, after risk adjustment, MA plans enrolled individuals with higher scores but lower costs conditional on their score. We find no evidence that overpayments were on net reduced. (JEL G22, H51, I13, I18)

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Metadata

Authors
Brown, J., Duggan, M., Kuziemko, I., & Woolston, W.
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2014-10-01
Volume
104
Issue
10
Pages
3335-3364
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1990922874
Cited by
265
References
32
FWCI
72.95
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: How Does Risk Selection Respond to Risk Adjustment? New Evidence from the Medicare Advantage Program. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.104.10.3335
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Brown, J., Duggan, M., Kuziemko, I., & Woolston, W. (2014). How Does Risk Selection Respond to Risk Adjustment? New Evidence from the Medicare Advantage Program. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.10.3335

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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