The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Does Culture Matter in Economic Behavior? Ultimatum Game Bargaining Among the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon
Abstract
Does Culture Matter in Economic Behavior? Ultimatum Game Bargaining among the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon by Joseph Henrich. Published in volume 90, issue 4, pages 973-979 of American Economic Review, September 2000
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,165
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
Culture and the Evolutionary Process
Griesemer, J. R., Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1986) · The Condor · doi:10.2307/1367778 · Cited by 7,034
The Handbook of experimental economics
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-1645 · Cited by 3,679
Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments
Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N. E., & Sefton, M. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1021 · Cited by 2,366
Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1056 · Cited by 1,674
Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners
Camerer, C., & Thaler, R. H. (1995) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.9.2.209 · Cited by 1,334
The Handbook of Experimental Economics
(2020) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctvzsmff5 · Cited by 1,105
(1991) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 695
RAISING THE STAKES IN THE ULTIMATUM GAME: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA
Cameron, L. A. (1999) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1999.tb01415.x · Cited by 552
Cited by
Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.159 · Cited by 3,239
Harrison, G. W., & List, J. A. (2004) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/0022051043004577 · Cited by 2,099
The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms
Bicchieri, C. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511616037 · Cited by 1,991
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., et al. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000142 · Cited by 1,898
Self-citationFoundations of Human Sociality
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., & Gintis, H. (2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199262055.001.0001 · Cited by 1,403
Self-citationStrong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms
Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-002-1012-7 · Cited by 1,372
Lost in translation? The effect of cultural values on mergers around the world
Ahern, K. R., Daminelli, D., & Fracassi, C. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.08.006 · Cited by 1,055
Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics
Smith, V. L. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322156954 · Cited by 960
Brosnan, S. F., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature01963 · Cited by 912
Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories
Konow, J. (2003) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205103771800013 · Cited by 852
Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis
Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R., & Van De Kuilen, G. (2004) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1023/b:exec.0000026978.14316.74 · Cited by 828
Experimental practices in economics: A challenge for psychologists?: (683322011-032)
Hertwig, R., & Ortmann, A. (2000) · PsycEXTRA Dataset · doi:10.1037/e683322011-032 · Cited by 668
Behavioural Development Economics: Lessons from Field Labs in the Developing World
Cardenas, J. C., & Carpenter, J. (2008) · The Journal of Development Studies · doi:10.1080/00220380701848327 · Cited by 591
Fernández, R. (2011) · Handbook of Social Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53187-2.00011-5 · Cited by 412
Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection
Bergstrom, T. C. (2002) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330027265 · Cited by 399
Güth, W., & Kocher, M. G. (2014) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.06.006 · Cited by 362
How time preferences differ: Evidence from 53 countries
Wang, M., Rieger, M. O., & Hens, T. (2016) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2015.12.001 · Cited by 331
Behavioural studies of strategic thinking in games
Camerer, C. F. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(03)00094-9 · Cited by 304
What do people bring into the game? Experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons
Cárdenas, J.-C., & Ostrom, E. (2004) · Agricultural Systems · doi:10.1016/j.agsy.2004.07.008 · Cited by 291
CARPENTER, J., & SEKI, E. (2011) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00268.x · Cited by 283
Walrasian Economics in Retrospect
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2000) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555006 · Cited by 279
Metadata
- Authors
- Henrich, J.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2000-09-01
- Volume
- 90
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 973-979
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1984176436
- Cited by
- 536
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 72.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.