The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring
Abstract
Theoretical work on the principal-agent problem in financial contracting focuses on the conflicts of interest between an agent / entrepreneur with a venture that needs financing, and a principal / investor providing funds for the venture. Theory has identified three primary ways that the investor / principal can mitigate these conflicts - structuring financial contracts, pre-investment screening, and post-investment monitoring and advising. In this paper, we describe recent empirical work and its relation to theory for one prominent class of principals venture capitalists (VCs). The empirical studies indicate that VCs attempt to mitigate principal-agent conflicts in the three ways suggested by theory. The evidence also shows that contracting, screening, and monitoring are closely interrelated. In screening, the VCs identify areas where they can add value through monitoring and support. In contracting, the VCs allocate rights in order to facilitate monitoring and minimize the impact of identified risks. Also, the equity allocated to VCs provides incentives to engage in costly support activities that increase upside values, rather than just minimizing potential losses. There is room for future empirical research to study these activities in greater detail for VCs, for other intermediaries such as banks, and within firms.
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Citations
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Cited by
Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start‐Up Firms: Empirical Evidence
Hellmann, T., & Puri, M. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00419 · Cited by 2,425
Kaplan, S. N., & Stromberg, P. (2003) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00245 · Cited by 1,533
Self-citationWhat Do Entrepreneurs Pay for Venture Capital Affiliation?
Hsu, D. H. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00680.x · Cited by 1,359
Kaplan, S., & Stromberg, P. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7660 · Cited by 1,180
Self-citationHow Smart Is Smart Money? A Two‐Sided Matching Model of Venture Capital
SØRENSEN, M. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01291.x · Cited by 1,007
Metadata
- Authors
- Kaplan, S. N., & Strömberg, P.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2001-05-01
- Volume
- 91
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 426-430
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2071128202
- Cited by
- 687
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 88.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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