The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
Abstract
We investigate the “generalized second-price” (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising. Although GSP looks similar to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. Unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truth-telling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to GSP and show that it has a unique equilibrium. This is an ex post equilibrium, with the same payoffs to all players as the dominant strategy equilibrium of VCG. (JEL D44, L81, M37)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Edelman, B., Ostrovsky, M., & Schwarz, M.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2007-02-01
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 242-259
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122305203
- Cited by
- 1,567
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 158.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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