The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences
Open accessAbstract
Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a “double coincidence of wants.” Developing infrastructure to perform three-way as well as two-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than three-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types. (JEL C78, I12)
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., & Ünver, M. U.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2007-05-01
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 828-851
- ISSN
- 0002-8282
- OpenAlex
- W3121213783
- Cited by
- 392
- References
- 40
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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