The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Politics of Free Trade Agreements
Open accessAbstract
Suppose that an opportunity arises for two countries to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA).Will an FTA between these countries be politically viable?And if so, what form will it take?We address these questions using a political-economy framework that emphasizes the interaction between industry special interest groups and an incumbent government.We describe the economic conditions necessary for an FTA to be an equilibrium outcome, both for the case when the agreement must cover all bilateral trade and when a few, politically sensitive sectors can be excluded from the agreement.
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Cites
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Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_7 · Cited by 3,302
Self-citationThe Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
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Cited by
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
The nature and growth of vertical specialization in world trade
Hummels, D., Ishii, J., & Yi, K.-M. (2001) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(00)00093-3 · Cited by 3,210
Do free trade agreements actually increase members' international trade?
Baier, S. L., & Bergstrand, J. H. (2007) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.02.005 · Cited by 2,692
UNMASKING THE POLLUTION HAVEN EFFECT*
Levinson, A., & Taylor, M. S. (2008) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00478.x · Cited by 1,112
The Design of International Trade Agreements: Introducing a New Dataset
Elsig, M., Dür, A., & Baccini, L. (2014) · doi:10.7892/boris.49460 · Cited by 745
Metadata
- Authors
- Grossman, G., & Helpman, E.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1993-12
- OpenAlex
- W3121319080
- Cited by
- 936
- References
- 11
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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