The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Difference That CEOs Make: An Assignment Model Approach
Abstract
This paper presents an assignment model of CEOs and firms. The distributions of CEO pay levels and firms' market values are analyzed as the competitive equilibrium of a matching market where talents, as well as CEO positions, are scarce. It is shown how the observed joint distribution of CEO pay and market value can then be used to infer the economic value of underlying ability differences. The variation in CEO pay is found to be mostly due to variation in firm characteristics, whereas implied differences in managerial ability are small and make relatively little difference to shareholder value. (JEL G32, M12, M52)
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Cited by
Quantifying Managerial Ability: A New Measure and Validity Tests
Demerjian, P., Lev, B., & McVay, S. (2012) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1487 · Cited by 1,887
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Metadata
- Authors
- Terviö, M.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2008-05-01
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 642-668
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2007872900
- Cited by
- 525
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 95.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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