The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Power of Focal Points Is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination Failures
Abstract
Since Schelling, it has often been assumed that players make use of salient decision labels to achieve coordination. Consistent with previous work, we find that given equal payoffs, salient labels yield frequent coordination. However, given even minutely asymmetric payoffs, labels lose much of their effectiveness and miscoordination abounds. This raises questions about the extent to which the effectiveness of focal points based on label salience persists beyond the special case of symmetric games. The patterns of miscoordination we observe vary with the magnitude of payoff differences in intricate ways that suggest nonequilibrium accounts based on “level-k” thinking and “team reasoning.” (JEL C72, C92)
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Cites
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Schelling, T. C. (1960) · Cited by 11,810
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A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
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Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study
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Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study
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Self-citationCommunication in Coordination Games
Cooper, R., DeJong, D. V., Forsythe, R., & Ross, T. W. (1992) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118488 · Cited by 687
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Krupka, E. L., & Weber, R. A. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12006 · Cited by 995
Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications
Crawford, V. P., Costa-Gomes, M. A., & Iriberri, N. (2013) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.51.1.5 · Cited by 505
Self-citationSocial framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?
Ellingsen, T., Johannesson, M., Mollerstrom, J., & Munkhammar, S. (2012) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.007 · Cited by 253
Social status as a cue for tacit coordination
Kwaadsteniet, E. W. D., & Dijk, E. V. (2010) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2010.01.005 · Cited by 113
Efficiency gains from team-based coordination-large-scale experimental evidence
Feri, F., Irlenbusch, B., & Sutter, M. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.4.1892 · Cited by 98
Metadata
- Authors
- Crawford, V. P., Gneezy, U., & Rottenstreich, Y.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2008-08-01
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1443-1458
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2057379083
- Cited by
- 264
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 31.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Crawford, V. P., Gneezy, U., & Rottenstreich, Y. (2008). The Power of Focal Points Is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination Failures. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.4.1443
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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