The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 47 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cognition and Incomplete Contracts
Abstract
Thinking about contingencies, designing covenants, and seeing through their implications is costly. Parties to a contract accordingly use heuristics and leave it incomplete. The paper develops a model of limited cognition and examines its consequences for contractual design. (JEL D23, D82, D86, L22)
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Tirole, J.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2009-02-01
- Volume
- 99
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 265-294
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2025045042
- Cited by
- 266
- References
- 47
- FWCI
- 42.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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