Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 62 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Political favoritism affects the allocation of government resources, but is it consequential for growth? Using a close election regression discontinuity design and data from India, we measure the local economic impact of being represented by a politician in the ruling party. Favoritism leads to higher private sector employment, higher share prices of firms, and increased output as measured by night lights; the three effects are similar and economically substantive. Finally, we present evidence that politicians influence firms primarily through control over the implementation of regulation. (JEL D72, L51, O17, O18, O43, R11)
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Cites
(2019) · AEA Papers and Proceedings · doi:10.1257/pandp.109.612 · Cited by 10,902
Financial Dependence and Growth
Rajan, R., & Zingales, L. (1996) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w5758 · Cited by 7,730
Regression discontinuity designs in economics
Lee, D. S., & Lemieux, T. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.2.281 · Cited by 4,534
Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice
Imbens, G. W., & Lemieux, T. (2008) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.001 · Cited by 3,694
Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Regression Discontinuity Design: A Density Test,
McCrary, J. (2008) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.005 · Cited by 3,600
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118354 · Cited by 3,336 · cited 1×
“…regression discontinuity is that constituencies where the ruling party candidate barely wins have similar unobservable 33 Candidates from unofficial parties are reported by the Electoral Commission as independents, so cannot be distinguished from true independents and are excluded from the sample.”
BackgroundEstimating the Value of Political Connections
Fisman, R. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.4.1095 · Cited by 2,968
Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts
FACCIO, M., MASULIS, R. W., & McCONNELL, J. J. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01000.x · Cited by 2,561 · cited 2×
“Favored firms are more likely to receive credit from state banks (Cole, 2009; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Carvalho, 2010) and corporate bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006), and their valuations are tied to the fortunes of powerful politicians (Fisman, 2001).”
BackgroundDo Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
Khwaja, A. I., & Mian, A. (2005) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355305775097524 · Cited by 2,366
Optimal Bandwidth Choice for the Regression Discontinuity Estimator
Imbens, G., & Kalyanaraman, K. (2012) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdr043 · Cited by 2,126
Cited by
Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Development: Evidence from India
GULZAR, S., & PASQUALE, B. J. (2017) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055416000502 · Cited by 202
Regression discontinuity designs in agricultural and environmental economics
Wuepper, D., & Finger, R. (2023) · European Review of Agricultural Economics · doi:10.1093/erae/jbac023 · Cited by 55
Metadata
- Authors
- Asher, S., & Novosad, P.
- Venue
- American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2017-01-01
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 229-273
- ISSN
- 1945-7782 (ISSN-L)
- 1945-7790
- OpenAlex
- W2504720826
- Cited by
- 184
- References
- 62
- FWCI
- 41.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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