Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 62 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Political favoritism affects the allocation of government resources, but is it consequential for growth? Using a close election regression discontinuity design and data from India, we measure the local economic impact of being represented by a politician in the ruling party. Favoritism leads to higher private sector employment, higher share prices of firms, and increased output as measured by night lights; the three effects are similar and economically substantive. Finally, we present evidence that politicians influence firms primarily through control over the implementation of regulation. (JEL D72, L51, O17, O18, O43, R11)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Asher, S., & Novosad, P.
- Venue
- American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2017-01-01
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 229-273
- ISSN
- 1945-7782 (ISSN-L)
- 1945-7790
- OpenAlex
- W2504720826
- Cited by
- 184
- References
- 62
- FWCI
- 41.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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