The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
Abstract
This article surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law—the use of public agents (inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. We first present the basic elements of the theory, focusing on the probability of imposition of sanctions, the magnitude and form of sanctions, and the rule of liability. We then examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, concerning accidental harms, costs of imposing fines, errors, general enforcement, marginal deterrence, the principal-agent relationship, settlements, self-reporting, repeat offenders, imperfect knowledge about the probability and magnitude of fines, and incapacitation.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
de Champs, E. (2017) · HAL · Cited by 6,669
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.
Shafer, G. R., Kahnerman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1984) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2288362 · Cited by 5,657
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation
Jean Tirole, Z., & Laffont, J. (1993) · Toulouse Capitole Publications (University Toulouse 1 Capitole) · Cited by 3,154
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
Becker, G. S., & Stigler, G. J. (1974) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467507 · Cited by 1,843
Wilson, J. Q., & Herrnstein, R. J. (1985) · DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) · Cited by 1,486
The Optimum Enforcement of Laws
Stigler, G. J. (1970) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259646 · Cited by 1,147
The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation
Levitt, S. D. (1996) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946681 · Cited by 817
An Economic Analysis of the Courts
Landes, W. M. (1971) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466704 · Cited by 780
The Rise of the Regulatory State
Glaeser, E. L., & Shleifer, A. (2001) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/.41.2.401 · Cited by 754
Cited by
What Works in Securities Laws?
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., & SHLEIFER, A. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00828.x · Cited by 2,785
Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration
Slemrod, J., & Yitzhaki, S. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7473 · Cited by 843
Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency
Fung, A., Graham, M., & Weil, D. (2007) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510533 · Cited by 752
A mutualistic approach to morality: The evolution of fairness by partner choice
Baumard, N., André, J.-B., & Sperber, D. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11002202 · Cited by 668
Public and private enforcement of securities laws: Resource-based evidence
Jackson, H. E., & Roe, M. J. (2009) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.08.006 · Cited by 568
Meek, W. R., Pacheco, D. F., & York, J. G. (2010) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2009.09.007 · Cited by 558
Bank supervision and corruption in lending
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2006) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.10.014 · Cited by 535
Glaeser, E., Johnson, S., & Shleifer, A. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530152466250 · Cited by 522
The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence
Gray, W. B., & Shimshack, J. P. (2011) · Review of Environmental Economics and Policy · doi:10.1093/reep/req017 · Cited by 519
Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non‐deterrent*
Tyran, J., & Feld, L. P. (2006) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00444.x · Cited by 418
Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance
Shimshack, J. P., & Ward, M. B. (2005) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2005.02.002 · Cited by 381
Medicare upcoding and hospital ownership
Silverman, E., & Skinner, J. (2004) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2003.09.007 · Cited by 350
Fiscal spending and the environment: Theory and empirics
López, R., Galinato, G. I., & Islam, A. (2011) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2011.03.001 · Cited by 343
Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America
Guasch, J. L., Laffont, J.-J., & Straub, S. (2008) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.05.003 · Cited by 342
The effectiveness of regulatory disclosure policies
Weil, D., Fung, A., Graham, M., & Fagotto, E. (2006) · Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · doi:10.1002/pam.20160 · Cited by 313
Corruption and optimal law enforcement
Polinsky, A. M., & Shavell, S. (2001) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(00)00127-4 · Cited by 283
Self-citationAre U.S. Cities Underpoliced? Theory and Evidence
Chalfin, A., & McCrary, J. (2018) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00694 · Cited by 260
Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research
Fredriksson, P., & Holmlund, B. (2006) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/j.0950-0804.2006.00283.x · Cited by 255
The Distortive Effects of Antitrust Fines Based on Revenue
Bageri, V., Katsoulacos, Y., & Spagnolo, G. (2013) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12079 · Cited by 69
External Verifiability of Accounting Information and Intangible Asset Transactions
Kim-Gina, J. (2018) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3186175 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Polinsky, A. M., & Shavell, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Literature
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2000-03-01
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 45-76
- ISSN
- 0022-0515 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122638853
- Cited by
- 1,159
- References
- 46
- FWCI
- 70.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.