What Policies Increase Prosocial Behavior? An Experiment with Referees at the Journal of Public Economics
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We evaluate policies to increase prosocial behavior using a field experiment with 1,500 referees at the Journal of Public Economics. We randomly assign referees to four groups: a control group with a six-week deadline to submit a referee report; a group with a four-week deadline; a cash incentive group rewarded with $100 for meeting the four-week deadline; and a social incentive group in which referees were told that their turnaround times would be publicly posted. We obtain four sets of results. First, shorter deadlines reduce the time referees take to submit reports substantially. Second, cash incentives significantly improve speed, especially in the week before the deadline. Cash payments do not crowd out intrinsic motivation: after the cash treatment ends, referees who received cash incentives are no slower than those in the four-week deadline group. Third, social incentives have smaller but significant effects on review times and are especially effective among tenured professors, who are less sensitive to deadlines and cash incentives. Fourth, all the treatments have little or no effect on rates of agreement to review, quality of reports, or review times at other journals. We conclude that small changes in journals' policies could substantially expedite peer review at little cost. More generally, price incentives, nudges, and social pressure are effective and complementary methods of increasing prosocial behavior.
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Cites
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“Existing evidence for this effect is based primarily on lab experiments (Deci et al. 1999; Frey and Jegen 2001; Kamenica 2012).”
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation.
Deci, E. L. (1971) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0030644 · Cited by 4,170
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02043 · Cited by 3,475 · cited 1×
“We analyze four sets of outcomes: 1) agreement to submit a review, 2) time taken to submit the review, 3) report quality, and 4) performance at other journals.”
Social norms and energy conservation
Allcott, H. (2011) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.03.003 · Cited by 2,802
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/468061 · Cited by 1,816
Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects
(2009) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta7384 · Cited by 1,081
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Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany
Dwenger, N., Kleven, H., Rasul, I., & Rincke, J. (2016) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.20150083 · Cited by 300
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“…when they cannot avoid the solicitor (DellaVigna et al. 2012), and academics review journal articles faster when their review times are made public (Chetty, Saez, and Sandor 2014).2 In terms of political participation, individuals are more likely to vote when their participation in elections is…”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Chetty, R., Saez, E., & Sándor, L.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2014-08-01
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 169-188
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2251869929
- Cited by
- 116
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 19.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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