The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work
Abstract
Many analysts presume that the appropriators of a common-pool resource are trapped in a Hobbesian state of nature and cannot themselves create rules to counteract the perverse incentives they face in managing the resource. The logical consequence of this view is to recommend that an external authority—"the" government—take over the commons. But considerable empirical evidence from field and experimental settings holds that appropriators frequently do constitute and enforce their own rules, and that these rules work. Our research agenda is to develop a coherent understanding of the set of conditions that enhance or detract from self-organizing capabilities when individuals differ substantially from one another. For the sake of concreteness, this paper focuses on the asymmetry present in most irrigation systems between those who are physically near the source of water (the head-enders) and those who are physically distant from it (the tail-enders). This paper first explores the interaction between head-end and tail-end farmers, particularly their decisions about whether to devote resources to the upkeep of the irrigation system, and how bargaining between the parties can benefit all sides. Finally, we examine empirical evidence from a study of irrigation institutions in Nepal and discuss the broader practical significance of our findings.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
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Self-citationHalting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities?
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A multi-agent reinforcement learning model of common-pool resource appropriation
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Designing institutions for irrigation management: Comparing irrigation agencies in Nepal and Taiwan
Fung Lam, W. (2006) · Property Management · doi:10.1108/02637470610658032 · Cited by 8
A multi-agent reinforcement learning model of reputation and cooperation in human groups
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ostrom, E., & Gardner, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1993-11-01
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 93-112
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1972458245
- Cited by
- 600
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 30.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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