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Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India

Hanna, Rema, Wang, Shing-Yi · 2017 · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Cited by 230

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Students in India who cheat on a simple laboratory task are more likely to prefer public sector jobs. This paper shows that cheating on this task predicts corrupt behavior by civil servants, implying that it is a meaningful predictor of future corruption. Students who demonstrate pro-social preferences are less likely to prefer government jobs, while outcomes on an explicit game and attitudinal measures to measure corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. A screening process that chooses high-ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption. The findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption. (JEL C91, D12, D73, H83, K42, O12, O17)

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Crossref · 10.1257/pol.20150029

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Metadata

Authors
Hanna, R., & Wang, S.-Y.
Venue
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Published
2017-08-01
Volume
9
Issue
3
Pages
262-290
ISSN
  • 1945-7731 (ISSN-L)
  • 1945-774X
OpenAlex
W2740384464
Cited by
230
References
8
FWCI
58.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/pol.20150029
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Hanna, R., & Wang, S.-Y. (2017). Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150029

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.