Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Students in India who cheat on a simple laboratory task are more likely to prefer public sector jobs. This paper shows that cheating on this task predicts corrupt behavior by civil servants, implying that it is a meaningful predictor of future corruption. Students who demonstrate pro-social preferences are less likely to prefer government jobs, while outcomes on an explicit game and attitudinal measures to measure corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. A screening process that chooses high-ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption. The findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption. (JEL C91, D12, D73, H83, K42, O12, O17)
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Cites
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Cited by
Challenges to capture the big five personality traits in non-WEIRD populations
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Cohn, A., Gesche, T., & Maréchal, M. A. (2022) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.3985 · Cited by 62
Metadata
- Authors
- Hanna, R., & Wang, S.-Y.
- Venue
- American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2017-08-01
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 262-290
- ISSN
- 1945-7731 (ISSN-L)
- 1945-774X
- OpenAlex
- W2740384464
- Cited by
- 230
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 58.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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