Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 41 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Yellow Vests, Pessimistic Beliefs, and Carbon Tax Aversion

Open access
Douenne, Thomas, Fabre, Adrien · 2022 · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

Abstract

Using a representative survey, we find that after the Yellow Vests movement, French people would largely reject a tax and dividend policy, i.e., a carbon tax whose revenues are redistributed uniformly to each adult. They overestimate their net monetary losses, wrongly think that the policy is regressive, and do not perceive it as environmentally effective. We show that changing people’s beliefs can substantially increase support. Although significant, the effects of our informational treatments on beliefs are small. Indeed, the respondents that oppose the tax tend to discard positive information about it, which is consistent with distrust, uncertainty, or motivated reasoning. (JEL D83, H23, H31, Q54, Q58)

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

Using a representative survey of 3,002 French households after the Yellow Vests movement, the paper shows that a carbon tax and dividend was widely rejected because people held overly pessimistic beliefs about its incidence, progressivity, and environmental effectiveness. Randomized information treatments and IV/RDD estimates indicate that correcting these beliefs could substantially raise support, but the treatments themselves often failed to persuade opponents.

Key findings

  • Only 10 percent of respondents approve of the €50/tCO₂ tax-and-dividend reform, while 70 percent disapprove. Although 70 percent of households are expected to benefit, only 14 percent think they would; 89 percent underestimate their purchasing-power gains relative to a household-specific estimate, and 77 percent do so even assuming inelastic expenditures.
  • People overestimate costs: average objective net gains for transport, housing, and both are €18, €6, and €24 per consumption unit, while average subjective net gains are −€61, −€43, and −€89; the median objective–subjective gap for the tax and dividend is €116.
  • Most do not see the policy as effective or progressive: only 15 percent say it would be environmentally effective (68 percent no, 18 percent don’t know), and only 19 percent think it would benefit the poorest (60 percent no, 20 percent don’t know). The estimated actual reduction is 5.7 MtCO₂e per year, or 0.8 percent of French annual emissions and 0.01 percent of global emissions.
  • Causal estimates show that believing one does not lose increases acceptance by more than 50 p.p. (53 p.p. in the main specification), and believing the tax is environmentally effective increases approval by more than 40 p.p. (42 p.p. in the main specification). If everyone could be convinced the reform is environmentally effective, acceptance would reach 61 percent and approval 45 percent; if everyone learned their win/lose category, acceptance would reach 47 percent.

Methods

  • Representative survey of 3,002 French households conducted in February–March 2019 through Bilendi, with quotas on six sociodemographic characteristics; median completion time was 19 minutes. The survey included random informational treatments on climate change, particulate matter, scientific consensus on carbon-tax effectiveness, progressivity, customized win/lose feedback, and randomly assigned eligibility thresholds for a tax and targeted dividend.
  • Objective benchmarks come from official Insee household surveys (BdF 2011, ENTD 2008, EL 2013, ERFS 2014). Household-specific net gains are computed as the dividend minus increases in transport and housing energy expenditures, using elasticities of −0.4 for transport and −0.2 for housing and assuming consumers bear 80 percent of energy-tax incidence; the out-of-sample win/lose prediction is correct in five of six cases (83.4 percent among predicted winners and among predicted losers).
  • Main analysis compares subjective beliefs with objective distributions, regresses a “large bias” indicator on respondent characteristics, and estimates causal effects using fuzzy RDD/2SLS: random eligibility for the targeted dividend and discontinuity in win/lose feedback instrument self-interest beliefs; random information on climate change and carbon-tax effectiveness instruments environmental-effectiveness beliefs; progressivity is examined with OLS/logit because the information treatment did not change beliefs.

Limitations

  • The paper states that it cannot causally identify the interaction effect of several motives combined; the progressivity effect is only noncausal because the information did not convince respondents; motivated reasoning is not demonstrated causally; and the mechanisms of distrust, uncertainty, motivated reasoning, and intentional misreporting are not fully distinguished.
  • The paper also states that external validity is uncertain: the mechanisms may generalize to other policies and contexts, but rejection may be lower elsewhere, and trust in government is unlikely to be restored in the short run.
  • Evident from the text: the analysis relies on self-reported energy equipment and usage, assumed elasticities (−0.4 transport, −0.2 housing) and 80 percent tax incidence, and a feedback prediction correct only five of six times; quotas were relaxed by 5–10 percent, and belief questions were not monetarily incentivized.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1257/pol.20200092

Cites

46 of 46 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

0 Valid · 0 Not valid · 23 Not checked · 151 Own results and interpretations

85 more claims

Create a free account to see all 174 claims and to verify the 36 references still open.

See all claims — free account
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 58
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 40

Create a free account to see these claims.

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Self-check results appear here once an independent check has confirmed them.

Cited works that were retracted

Works this paper cites that were later retracted, from the retraction notices publishers deposit. Major when the notice came out before this paper was published.

1 of 1

Citations

Cites

Show all 43 references

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Brehm, Jack W. 1966. A Theory of Psychological Reactance. New York: Academic Press.
  2. Douenne, Thomas, and Adrien Fabre. 2022. "Replication data for: Yellow Vests, Pessimistic Beliefs, and Carbon Tax Aversion." American Economic Association [publisher], Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]. https://doi.org/10.38886/E128143V1. · doi:10.38886/e128143v1
  3. Foucault Martial, 2019, Sciences Po, 2019
  4. Hovland, Carl Iver, Irving L. Janis, and Harold H. Kelley. 1953. Communication and Persuasion; Psychological Studies of Opinion Change. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Cited by

Items 301–400 of 407

Metadata

Authors
Douenne, T., & Fabre, A.
Affiliations
  • Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (FR)
  • ETH Zurich (CH)
Venue
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Published
2022-02-01
Volume
14
Issue
1
Pages
81-110
ISSN
  • 1945-774X (ISSN-L)
  • 1945-7731
OpenAlex
W4210586077
Cited by
364
References
43
Citations by year
2026: 79 · 2025: 83 · 2024: 79 · 2023: 61 · 2022: 38
FWCI
47.67
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
other-oa
Locations
  • American Economic Journal Economic Policy (publishedVersion)
  • UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • HAL (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Funders
Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR-16-CE03-0011, ANR-17-EURE-0001, ANR-17)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
  • Physical Sciences › Energy › Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment › Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Climate Change Communication and Perception
Keywords
Yellow Vests movement, carbon tax, public opinion on climate policy, belief updating, information effects, motivated reasoning, climate policy support

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-11-16, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).

A second model labelled each claim on 2026-11-16 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.