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Yellow Vests, Pessimistic Beliefs, and Carbon Tax Aversion
Open accessAbstract
Using a representative survey, we find that after the Yellow Vests movement, French people would largely reject a tax and dividend policy, i.e., a carbon tax whose revenues are redistributed uniformly to each adult. They overestimate their net monetary losses, wrongly think that the policy is regressive, and do not perceive it as environmentally effective. We show that changing people’s beliefs can substantially increase support. Although significant, the effects of our informational treatments on beliefs are small. Indeed, the respondents that oppose the tax tend to discard positive information about it, which is consistent with distrust, uncertainty, or motivated reasoning. (JEL D83, H23, H31, Q54, Q58)
Overview
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TL;DR
Using a representative survey of 3,002 French households after the Yellow Vests movement, the paper shows that a carbon tax and dividend was widely rejected because people held overly pessimistic beliefs about its incidence, progressivity, and environmental effectiveness. Randomized information treatments and IV/RDD estimates indicate that correcting these beliefs could substantially raise support, but the treatments themselves often failed to persuade opponents.
Key findings
- Only 10 percent of respondents approve of the €50/tCO₂ tax-and-dividend reform, while 70 percent disapprove. Although 70 percent of households are expected to benefit, only 14 percent think they would; 89 percent underestimate their purchasing-power gains relative to a household-specific estimate, and 77 percent do so even assuming inelastic expenditures.
- People overestimate costs: average objective net gains for transport, housing, and both are €18, €6, and €24 per consumption unit, while average subjective net gains are −€61, −€43, and −€89; the median objective–subjective gap for the tax and dividend is €116.
- Most do not see the policy as effective or progressive: only 15 percent say it would be environmentally effective (68 percent no, 18 percent don’t know), and only 19 percent think it would benefit the poorest (60 percent no, 20 percent don’t know). The estimated actual reduction is 5.7 MtCO₂e per year, or 0.8 percent of French annual emissions and 0.01 percent of global emissions.
- Causal estimates show that believing one does not lose increases acceptance by more than 50 p.p. (53 p.p. in the main specification), and believing the tax is environmentally effective increases approval by more than 40 p.p. (42 p.p. in the main specification). If everyone could be convinced the reform is environmentally effective, acceptance would reach 61 percent and approval 45 percent; if everyone learned their win/lose category, acceptance would reach 47 percent.
Methods
- Representative survey of 3,002 French households conducted in February–March 2019 through Bilendi, with quotas on six sociodemographic characteristics; median completion time was 19 minutes. The survey included random informational treatments on climate change, particulate matter, scientific consensus on carbon-tax effectiveness, progressivity, customized win/lose feedback, and randomly assigned eligibility thresholds for a tax and targeted dividend.
- Objective benchmarks come from official Insee household surveys (BdF 2011, ENTD 2008, EL 2013, ERFS 2014). Household-specific net gains are computed as the dividend minus increases in transport and housing energy expenditures, using elasticities of −0.4 for transport and −0.2 for housing and assuming consumers bear 80 percent of energy-tax incidence; the out-of-sample win/lose prediction is correct in five of six cases (83.4 percent among predicted winners and among predicted losers).
- Main analysis compares subjective beliefs with objective distributions, regresses a “large bias” indicator on respondent characteristics, and estimates causal effects using fuzzy RDD/2SLS: random eligibility for the targeted dividend and discontinuity in win/lose feedback instrument self-interest beliefs; random information on climate change and carbon-tax effectiveness instruments environmental-effectiveness beliefs; progressivity is examined with OLS/logit because the information treatment did not change beliefs.
Limitations
- The paper states that it cannot causally identify the interaction effect of several motives combined; the progressivity effect is only noncausal because the information did not convince respondents; motivated reasoning is not demonstrated causally; and the mechanisms of distrust, uncertainty, motivated reasoning, and intentional misreporting are not fully distinguished.
- The paper also states that external validity is uncertain: the mechanisms may generalize to other policies and contexts, but rejection may be lower elsewhere, and trust in government is unlikely to be restored in the short run.
- Evident from the text: the analysis relies on self-reported energy equipment and usage, assumed elasticities (−0.4 transport, −0.2 housing) and 80 percent tax incidence, and a feedback prediction correct only five of six times; quotas were relaxed by 5–10 percent, and belief questions were not monetarily incentivized.
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In the paper
“We find that the people most opposed to the policy, and in particular those that support the Yellow Vests, are the most biased, i.e., the most inclined to overestimate their losses.”
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Indeed, the respondents that oppose the tax tend to discard positive information about it”
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“among those who would benefit from the reform despite pessimistically believing that they would lose, only 12 percent are convinced that they would gain when we disclose our estimation to them.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“and do not perceive it as environmentally effective.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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In the paper
“We also provide noncausal evidence that believing in the progressivity of the scheme has a large effect on support.”
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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Cited works that were retracted
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In the paper
“Yuchen Wang, Xiaoming Zhou, Anis Ali, Abdullah Bin Omar, Zia Ur Rahman. 2022. Carbon pricing and environmental response: A way forward for China's carbon and energy market. Frontiers in Environmental Science 10. . [Crossref]”
Cited work 10.3389/fenvs.2022.956469 · retracted 2023-09-04 · notice 10.3389/fenvs.2023.1285096 · this paper published 2022-02-01
Citations
Cites
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A Robust Test for Weak Instruments
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How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments
Kuziemko, I., Norton, M. I., Saez, E., & Stantcheva, S. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20130360 · Cited by 1,067
Redlawsk, D. P. (2002) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1111/1468-2508.00161 · Cited by 978
Intergenerational Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution
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Mindful Economics: The Production, Consumption, and Value of Beliefs
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2016) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.30.3.141 · Cited by 817
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Brehm, Jack W. 1966. A Theory of Psychological Reactance. New York: Academic Press.
- Douenne, Thomas, and Adrien Fabre. 2022. "Replication data for: Yellow Vests, Pessimistic Beliefs, and Carbon Tax Aversion." American Economic Association [publisher], Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]. https://doi.org/10.38886/E128143V1. · doi:10.38886/e128143v1
- Foucault Martial, 2019, Sciences Po, 2019
- Hovland, Carl Iver, Irving L. Janis, and Harold H. Kelley. 1953. Communication and Persuasion; Psychological Studies of Opinion Change. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Cited by
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Fueling resentment: From vulnerability to fuel price increases to political discontent
Lahunovich, Y., Mattioli, G., Varavallo, G., & BARBERA, F. (2026) · Energy Research & Social Science · doi:10.1016/j.erss.2026.105034
Populist opposition to climate policy: the role of policy design
Schuster, A., & Huber, R. A. (2026) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501763.2026.2745996
Pulatov, D. X., Abdiyev, M. M., & Shamsiyev, F. E. (2026) · Экономика и социум · doi:10.24412/2225-1545-2026-9148-392-402
Zemo, K. H., & Termansen, M. (2026) · Food Policy · doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2026.103214
Beyond Persuasion: Policy Design, Fairness, and Public Support for Net-Zero
McGrath, L. F. (2026) · LSE Public Policy Review · doi:10.31389/lseppr.172
Comment penser la transition juste ? Revue de littérature
Waechter, J. (2026) · L'Europe en formation · doi:10.3917/eufor.402.0013
Effective, Credible, and Acceptable: How to Ensure the EU ETS Delivers on Climate Targets
Borghesi, S., Ferrari, A., & Lessmann, K. (2026) · Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change · doi:10.1002/wcc.70092
Metadata
- Authors
- Douenne, T., & Fabre, A.
- Affiliations
- Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (FR)
- ETH Zurich (CH)
- Venue
- American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2022-02-01
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 81-110
- ISSN
- 1945-774X (ISSN-L)
- 1945-7731
- OpenAlex
- W4210586077
- Semantic Scholar
- 29ae2ea71e14100ce3886bdd5a540552eac9466b
- Cited by
- 364
- References
- 43
- Citations by year
- 2026: 79 · 2025: 83 · 2024: 79 · 2023: 61 · 2022: 38
- FWCI
- 47.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- handle.uba.uva.nl
- Licence
- other-oa
- Locations
- American Economic Journal Economic Policy (publishedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- HAL (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR-16-CE03-0011, ANR-17-EURE-0001, ANR-17)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
- Physical Sciences › Energy › Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment › Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Climate Change Communication and Perception
- Keywords
- Yellow Vests movement, carbon tax, public opinion on climate policy, belief updating, information effects, motivated reasoning, climate policy support
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