The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Hot Cognition or Cool Consideration? Testing the Effects of Motivated Reasoning on Political Decision Making
Abstract
Researchers attempting to understand how citizens process political information have advanced motivated reasoning to explain the joint role of affect and cognition. The prominence of affect suggests that all social information processing is affectively charged and prone to biases. This article makes use of a unique data set collected using a dynamic information board experiment to test important effects of motivated reasoning. In particular, affective biases should cause citizens to take longer processing information incongruent with their existing affect and such biases should also direct search for new information about candidates. Somewhat perversely, motivated reasoners may actually increase their support of a positively evaluated candidate upon learning new negatively evaluated information. Findings are reported that support all of these expectations. Additional analysis shows that these affective biases may easily lead to lower quality decision making, leading to a direct challenge to the notion of voters as rational Bayesian updaters.
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Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
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Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
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The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion
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“2 But see Zaller (1992) for some strong skepticism about the role of on-line processing.”
BackgroundAutomatic vigilance: The attention-grabbing power of negative social information.
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Cited by
Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs
Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00214.x · Cited by 4,344
When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions
Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2010) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-010-9112-2 · Cited by 3,173
Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory
Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10000968 · Cited by 2,254
How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation
DRUCKMAN, J. N., PETERSON, E., & SLOTHUUS, R. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000500 · Cited by 1,569
Tucker, J. A., Guess, A., Barbera, P., Vaccari, C., Siegel, A., Sanovich, S., Stukal, D., & Nyhan, B. (2018) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3144139 · Cited by 1,222
Metadata
- Authors
- Redlawsk, D. P.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2002-11
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1021-1044
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W2148685192
- Cited by
- 978
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 14.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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