Reputation and Uncertainty in Online Markets: An Experimental Study
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper employs a modified investment game to study how online reputation ratings are assigned, and thus how electronic reputations are formed in transactions where buyers and sellers interact anonymously. Of particular interest are the important questions of how online reputations evolve and how specific reputation information is interpreted by market participants. We vary the level of uncertainty in the transaction environment, and measure the effects of this manipulation on buyers' trust and their subsequent rating behaviors. We distinguish between a reputation mechanism and specific reputation information, finding the former has an association with the overall decision of whether to transact in the marketplace, while the latter shows significance in purchase decisions regarding specific sellers. We also find that aggregate reputation information is weighted differently than singular reputation information. Finally, we show that when reputations are increasingly noisy, buyers are less likely to react negatively to poor ratings and are more likely to give sellers the benefit of the doubt when seemingly uncooperative outcomes occur.
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Citations
Cites
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
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Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
Shapiro, C. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1881782 · Cited by 2,327 · cited 1×
“Likewise, sellers’ should be rewarded for good reputations, and these rewards should exceed the possible gains from opportunism (Shapiro 1983).”
BackgroundResnick, P., Kuwabara, K., Zeckhauser, R., & Friedman, E. (2000) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/355112.355122 · Cited by 2,190 · cited 1×
“Studies specifically focusing on electronic reputation systems show these mechanisms to be effective in building trust and cooperation in online communities (Resnick et al. 2000, Dellarocas 2003).”
BackgroundThe value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment
Resnick, P., Zeckhauser, R., Swanson, J., & Lockwood, K. (2006) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-4309-2 · Cited by 1,118
Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model
Camerer, C., & Weigelt, K. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911840 · Cited by 572
Establishing online trust through a community responsibility system
Ba, S. (2001) · Decision Support Systems · doi:10.1016/s0167-9236(00)00144-5 · Cited by 361
Cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation
Bolton, G. E., Katok, E., & Ockenfels, A. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.03.008 · Cited by 305
Cited by
See-To, E. W. K., & Ho, K. K. W. (2014) · Computers in Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.chb.2013.10.013 · Cited by 586
“Popularity Effect” in User-Generated Content: Evidence from Online Product Reviews
Goes, P. B., Lin, M., & Au Yeung, C.-M. (2014) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.2013.0512 · Cited by 405
Kwark, Y., Chen, J., & Raghunathan, S. (2017) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.25300/misq/2017/41.3.05 · Cited by 350
Unpacking the social media phenomenon: towards a research agenda
Kietzmann, J. H., Silvestre, B. S., McCarthy, I. P., & Pitt, L. F. (2012) · Journal of Public Affairs · doi:10.1002/pa.1412 · Cited by 261
Content Contribution for Revenue Sharing and Reputation in Social Media: A Dynamic Structural Model
Tang, Q., Gu, B., & Whinston, A. B. (2012) · Journal of Management Information Systems · doi:10.2753/mis0742-1222290203 · Cited by 243
“Many social media web sites provide specially designed reputation mechanisms to facilitate online interactions [21, 53].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Rice, S. C.
- Venue
- Information Systems Research
- Published
- 2012-06
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 436-452
- ISSN
- 1047-7047 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5536
- OpenAlex
- W1974795237
- Cited by
- 99
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 12.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.