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Content vs. Advertising: The Impact of Competition on Media Firm Strategy

Godes, David, Ofek, Elie, Sarvary, Miklos · 2009 · Marketing Science
Cited by 183

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Media firms compete in two connected markets. They face rivalry for the sale of content to consumers, and at the same time, they compete for advertisers seeking access to the attention of these consumers. We explore the implications of such two-sided competition on the actions and source of profits of media firms. One main conclusion we reach is that media firms may charge higher content prices in a duopoly than in a monopoly. This happens because competition for advertisers can reduce the return per customer impression from the ad market, making each firm less willing to underprice content to increase demand. Greater competitive intensity may thus increase content profits and decrease ad profits. These findings are in sharp contrast to those in a regular one-sided product market, in which competition typically lowers product prices and profits. We extend the framework to examine competition across different media (e.g., between magazines and cable TV) and show that firms in a duopolistic medium may benefit from more intense competition from a monopolist in another medium. We characterize the conditions for each firm in the duopoly medium to bundle more ads and earn greater total profits than the rival firm in the monopoly medium.

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 19

  1. 10.1111/0034-6527.00357 · DOI · Paper page
  2. 10.1080/00913367.2004.10639161 · DOI · Paper page
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  7. 10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00229.x · DOI
  8. 10.1093/ei/cbj008 · doi:10.1093/ei/cbj008
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  11. Gershberg M., 2004, Boston Globe, c3
  12. 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.06.002 · DOI · Paper page
  13. 10.1287/mksc.1030.0042 · DOI
  14. Masson R., 1990, Quart. Rev. Econom. Bus., 30, 3
  15. McBride S., 2005, Wall Street Journal, D4
  16. Schwartz J., 2004, New York Times
  17. 10.2307/2555525 · DOI · Paper page
  18. VanBoskirk S., Anderson E., Cohen S. M., Joseph J. Interactive marketing channels to watch in 2006. (2006) (Forrester Research, Cambridge, MA)
  19. Vives X., 2001, Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Godes, D., Ofek, E., & Sarvary, M.
Venue
Marketing Science
Published
2009-01
Volume
28
Issue
1
Pages
20-35
ISSN
  • 0732-2399 (ISSN-L)
  • 1526-548X
OpenAlex
W2134715916
Cited by
183
References
2
FWCI
17.31
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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