Another Hidden Cost of Incentives: The Detrimental Effect on Norm Enforcement
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Monetary incentives, such as subsidies or bonuses, are often considered as a way to foster contributions to public goods in society and firms. This paper investigates experimentally the effect of private contribution incentives in the presence of a norm enforcement mechanism. Norm enforcement through peer punishment has been shown to be effective in raising contributions by itself. We test whether and how (centrally provided) private incentives interact with (decentralized) punishment, both of which affect subjects' monetary payoffs. The results of our experiment show that private incentives for contributors can reduce the effectiveness of the norm enforcement mechanism: Free riders are punished less harshly in the treatment with incentives, and as a consequence, average contributions to the public good are no higher than without incentives. This finding ties to and extends previous research on settings in which monetary incentives may fail to have the desired effect.
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Cites
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“…contributions in a number of situations, as standard economics would predict.2 However, a growing body of evidence in psychology (for a survey, see Deci et al., 1999) and economics (for surveys, see Frey and Jegen, 2001; Bowles, 2008) finds that monetary incentives can crowd out individuals’…”
BackgroundAltruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Robust Inference With Multiway Clustering
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. B., & Miller, D. L. (2011) · Journal of Business & Economic Statistics · doi:10.1198/jbes.2010.07136 · Cited by 3,203
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Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554917 · Cited by 2,175
Antisocial Punishment Across Societies
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1153808 · Cited by 2,038
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/468061 · Cited by 1,816
The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment
de Quervain, D. J.-F., Fischbacher, U., Treyer, V., Schellhammer, M., Schnyder, U., Buck, A., & Fehr, E. (2004) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1100735 · Cited by 1,768 · cited 2×
“…are motivated to punish free riders because it allows them to vent their anger and express disapproval (Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009), and that they derive satisfaction from the act of punishing norm violations (de Quervain et al., 2004).”
BackgroundDoing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially
Ariely, D., Bracha, A., & Meier, S. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.544 · Cited by 1,753
Self-citation
Cited by
Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially
Ariely, D., Bracha, A., & Meier, S. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.544 · Cited by 1,753
Self-citationWhen and Why Incentives (Don't) Work to Modify Behavior
Gneezy, U., Meier, S., & Rey-Biel, P. (2011) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.25.4.191 · Cited by 1,735
Self-citationMas, A., & Moretti, E. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.112 · Cited by 1,280
Reward, punishment, and cooperation: A meta-analysis.
Balliet, D., Mulder, L. B., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2011) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0023489 · Cited by 720
Scherer, A. G., & Voegtlin, C. (2020) · Academy of Management Perspectives · doi:10.5465/amp.2017.0175 · Cited by 345
Metadata
- Authors
- Fuster, A., & Meier, S.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2010-01
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57-70
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2047807786
- Cited by
- 87
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 10.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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