Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 580

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information

Harsanyi, John C., Selten, Reinhard·1972·Management Science

Abstract

The paper extends Nash's theory of two-person bargaining games with fixed threats to bargaining situations with incomplete information. After defining such bargaining situations, a formal bargaining model (bargaining game) will be proposed for them. This bargaining game, regarded as noncooperative game, will be analyzed in terms of a certain class of equilibrium points with special stability properties, to be called “strict” equilibrium points. Finally an axiomatic theory will be developed in order to select a unique solution from the set X of payoff vectors corresponding to such strict equilibrium points (as well as to probability mixtures of the latter). It will be shown that the solution satisfying the axioms proposed in this paper is the point where a certain generalized Nash product is maximized over this set X.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1287/mnsc.18.5.80

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 1 references

Cited by

See all 580

Metadata

Authors
Harsanyi, J. C., & Selten, R.
Venue
Management Science
Published
1972-01
Volume
18
Issue
5-part-2
Pages
80-106
ISSN
  • 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
  • 1526-5501
OpenAlex
W2103138133
Cited by
580
References
1
FWCI
5.29
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1287/mnsc.18.5.80
The paper
Harsanyi, J. C., & Selten, R. (1972). A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.18.5.80

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.