The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Screening Peers Softly: Inferring the Quality of Small Borrowers
Open accessAbstract
This paper examines the performance of new online lending markets that rely on nonexpert individuals to screen their peers’ creditworthiness. We find that these peer lenders predict an individual’s likelihood of defaulting on a loan with 45% greater accuracy than the borrower’s exact credit score (unobserved by the lenders, who only see a credit category). Moreover, peer lenders achieve 87% of the predictive power of an econometrician who observes all standard financial information about borrowers. Screening through soft or nonstandard information is relatively more important when evaluating lower-quality borrowers. Our results highlight how aggregating over the views of peers and leveraging nonstandard information can enhance lending efficiency. This paper was accepted by Amit Seru, finance.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
DeLong, E. R., DeLong, D. M., & Clarke-Pearson, D. L. (1988) · Biometrics · doi:10.2307/2531595 · Cited by 22,649
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets
Stiglitz, J. E., & Grossman, S. J. (1980) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8765r99 · Cited by 3,645
Berger, A. N., Miller, N. H., Petersen, M. A., Rajan, R. G., & Stein, J. C. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.003 · Cited by 1,888
ON THE EFFICIENCY OF COMPETITIVE STOCK MARKETS WHERE TRADES HAVE DIVERSE INFORMATION
Grossman, S. (1976) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01907.x · Cited by 1,437
Distance and Private Information in Lending
Agarwal, S., & Hauswald, R. (2010) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhq001 · Cited by 1,300
Lin, M., Prabhala, N. R., & Viswanathan, S. (2013) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1120.1560 · Cited by 1,299
Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans*
Keys, B. J., Mukherjee, T., Seru, A., & Vig, V. (2010) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2010.125.1.307 · Cited by 1,092
Farrell, J., & Rabin, M. (1996) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.10.3.103 · Cited by 1,012
Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination
Altonji, J. G., & Pierret, C. R. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355301556329 · Cited by 894
Wolfers, J., & Zitzewitz, E. (2004) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330041371321 · Cited by 889
Farber, H. S., & Gibbons, R. (1996) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946706 · Cited by 711
Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination
Altonji, J., & Pierret, C. (1997) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w6279 · Cited by 598
Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information in Laboratory Security Markets
Plott, C. R., & Sunder, S. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911360 · Cited by 585
The failure of models that predict failure: Distance, incentives, and defaults
Rajan, U., Seru, A., & Vig, V. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.09.012 · Cited by 497
Estimating the Effect of Hierarchies on Information Use
Liberti, J. M., & Mian, A. R. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn118 · Cited by 492
What's in a Picture?: Evidence of Discrimination from Prosper.com
Pope, D. G., & Sydnor, J. R. (2011) · Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.1353/jhr.2011.0025 · Cited by 490
(2008) · doi:10.1126/science.1157679 · Cited by 406
Payday lenders: Heroes or villains?
Morse, A. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.022 · Cited by 386
Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending
Adams, W., Einav, L., & Levin, J. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.49 · Cited by 369
What’s in a Picture?: Evidence of Discrimination from Prosper.com
Pope, D. G., & Sydnor, J. R. (2011) · Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.3368/jhr.46.1.53 · Cited by 330
Adverse Incentives in Crowdfunding
Hildebrand, T., Puri, M., & Rocholl, J. (2017) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2339 · Cited by 312
Liar's Loan? Effects of Origination Channel and Information Falsification on Mortgage Delinquency
Jiang, W., Nelson, A. A., & Vytlacil, E. (2014) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00387 · Cited by 278
Price Discovery without Trading: Evidence from the Nasdaq Preopening
Cao, C., Ghysels, E., & Hatheway, F. (2000) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00249 · Cited by 231
Historical presidential betting markets
Rhode, P. W., & Strumpf, K. S. (2004) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330041371277 · Cited by 228
Information Aggregation in an Experimental Market
Forsythe, R., & Lundholm, R. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938206 · Cited by 224
How Fast do Rational Agents Learn?
Vives, X. (1993) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298060 · Cited by 217
Love & Loans: The Effect of Beauty and Personal Characteristics in Credit Markets
Ravina, E. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1107307 · Cited by 209
Information aggregation and manipulation in an experimental market
Hanson, R., Oprea, R., & Porter, D. (2006) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.011 · Cited by 186
The impact of credit scoring on consumer lending
Einav, L., Jenkins, M., & Levin, J. (2013) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12019 · Cited by 185
Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings
Wolinsky, A. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938332 · Cited by 180
Market Anticipations, Rational Expectations, and Bayesian Analysis
Townsend, R. M. (1978) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2526314 · Cited by 157
Can Asset Markets Be Manipulated? A Field Experiment With Racetrack Betting
Camerer, C. F. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250018 · Cited by 141
Learning by Doing with Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Prosper.com
Freedman, S. M., & Jin, G. Z. (2011) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w16855 · Cited by 131
The Effects of Usury Laws: Evidence from the Online Loan Market
Rigbi, O. (2012) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00310 · Cited by 108
Agarwal, S. D., Ambrose, B. W., Souphala Chomsisengphet, B., & Liu, C. (2011) · Journal of money credit and banking · doi:10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00390.x · Cited by 83
Peer-to-Peer Crowdfunding: Information and the Potential for Disruption in Consumer LendingPreprint
Morse, A. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2551272 · Cited by 69
Peer-to-Peer Crowdfunding: Information and the Potential for Disruption in Consumer Lending
Morse, A. (2015) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w20899 · Cited by 69
Cited by
On the Rise of FinTechs: Credit Scoring Using Digital Footprints
Berg, T., Burg, V., Gombović, A., & Puri, M. (2020) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhz099 · Cited by 919
The emergence of the global fintech market: economic and technological determinants
Haddad, C., & Hornuf, L. (2019) · Small Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s11187-018-9991-x · Cited by 754
Liberti, J. M., & Petersen, M. A. (2019) · The Review of Corporate Finance Studies · doi:10.1093/rcfs/cfy009 · Cited by 737
Peer-to-Peer Lenders Versus Banks: Substitutes or Complements?
Tang, H. (2019) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhy137 · Cited by 663
The economics of crowdfunding platforms
Belleflamme, P., Omrani, N., & Peitz, M. (2015) · Information Economics and Policy · doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2015.08.003 · Cited by 603
Metadata
- Authors
- Iyer, R., Khwaja, A. I., Luttmer, E. F. P., & Shue, K.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2016-06
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1554-1577
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W1836875240
- Cited by
- 620
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 83.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.