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Cited by 312

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Adverse Incentives in Crowdfunding

Open access
Hildebrand, Thomas, Puri, Manju, Rocholl, Jörg·2017·Management Science

Abstract

This paper analyzes the substantially growing markets for crowdfunding, in which retail investors lend to borrowers without financial intermediaries. Critics suggest that these markets allow sophisticated investors to take advantage of unsophisticated investors. The growth and viability of these markets critically depend on the underlying incentives. We provide evidence of perverse incentives in crowdfunding that are not fully recognized by the market. In particular, we look at group leader bids in the presence of origination fees and find that these bids are (wrongly) perceived as a signal of good loan quality, resulting in lower interest rates. Yet these loans actually have higher default rates. These adverse incentives are overcome only with sufficient skin in the game and when there are no origination fees. The results from the analysis in this paper provide more general implications for crowdfunding, its structure, and its regulation. This paper was accepted by Wei Jiang, finance.

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Metadata

Authors
Hildebrand, T., Puri, M., & Rocholl, J.
Venue
Management Science
Published
2017-03
Volume
63
Issue
3
Pages
587-608
ISSN
  • 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
  • 1526-5501
OpenAlex
W3121324858
Cited by
312
References
22
FWCI
51.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Adverse Incentives in Crowdfunding. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2339
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Hildebrand, T., Puri, M., & Rocholl, J. (2017). Adverse Incentives in Crowdfunding. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2339

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