The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Effect of Discretion on Procurement Performance
Abstract
We run a regression discontinuity design analysis to document the causal effect of increasing buyers’ discretion on procurement outcomes in a large database for public works in Italy. Works with a value above a given threshold have to be awarded through an open auction. Works below this threshold can be more easily awarded through a restricted auction, where the buyer has some discretion in terms of who (not) to invite to bid. Our main result is that discretion increases the probability that the same firm wins repeatedly, and it does not deteriorate (and may improve) the procurement outcomes we observe. The effects of discretion persist when we repeat the analysis controlling for the geographical location, corruption, social capital, and judicial efficiency in the region of the public buyers running the auctions. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2628 . This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.
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Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Regression discontinuity designs in economics
Lee, D. S., & Lemieux, T. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.2.281 · Cited by 4,534
Using Maimonides' Rule to Estimate the Effect of Class Size on Scholastic Achievement
Angrist, J. D., & Lavy, V. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556061 · Cited by 1,482
Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach
DiNardo, J., Fortin, N., & Lemieux, T. (1995) · doi:10.3386/w5093 · Cited by 759
Van Der Klaauw, W. (2002) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00055 · Cited by 722
Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment
Bandiera, O., Prat, A., & Valletti, T. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1278 · Cited by 534 · cited 6×
“Our paper provides corroborating evidence to the result (among many others) of Bandiera et al. (2009) that overall waste in the procurement of Italian goods and services is substantially smaller for more autonomous public purchasing authorities that enjoy more discretion than others.”
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Cited by
Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil
Zamboni, Y., & Litschig, S. (2018) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.03.008 · Cited by 151
Lights on the shadows of public procurement: Transparency as an antidote to corruption
Bauhr, M., Czibik, Á., de Fine Licht, J., & Fazekas, M. (2020) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12432 · Cited by 131
Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes
Decarolis, F., Giuffrida, L., Iossa, E., Mollisi, V., & Spagnolo, G. (2018) · doi:10.3386/w24201 · Cited by 88
Self-citationPlaček, M., Valentinov, V., del Campo, C., Vaceková, G., Ochrana, F., & Šumpíková, M. (2021) · Environmental Sciences Europe · doi:10.1186/s12302-021-00534-7 · Cited by 36
The impact of e-procurement on institutional quality
Mélon, L., & Spruk, R. (2020) · Journal of Public Procurement · doi:10.1108/jopp-07-2019-0050 · Cited by 33
Metadata
- Authors
- Coviello, D., Guglielmo, A., & Spagnolo, G.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2018-02
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 715-738
- ISSN
- 0025-1909
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W3121999802
- Cited by
- 182
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 12.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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