The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Exceptional Paper—Probability Encoding in Decision Analysis
Abstract
This paper presents the present philosophy and practice used in probability encoding by the Decision Analysis Group at Stanford Research Institute. Probability encoding, the process of extracting and quantifying individual judgment about uncertain quantities, is one of the major functions required in the performance of decision analysis. The paper discusses the setting of the encoding process, including the use of sensitivity analyses to identify crucial state variables for which extensive encoding procedures are appropriate. The importance of balancing modeling and encoding techniques is emphasized and examples of biases and unconscious modes of judgment are reviewed. A variety of encoding methods are presented and their applicability is discussed. The authors recommend and describe a structured interview process that utilizes a trained interviewer and a number of techniques designed to reduce biases and aid in the quantification of judgment.
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Citations
Cites
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 · Cited by 9,984
On the psychology of prediction.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0034747 · Cited by 6,202
Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(72)90016-3 · Cited by 4,851
Man as an intuitive statistician.
Peterson, C. R., & Beach, L. R. (1967) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/h0024722 · Cited by 963
The Foundations of Decision Analysis
Howard, R. A. (1968) · IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics · doi:10.1109/tssc.1968.300115 · Cited by 377
Rapoport, A., & Wallsten, T. S. (1972) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.23.020172.001023 · Cited by 252
Experiments in the laboratory and the real world
Winkler, R. L., & Murphy, A. H. (1973) · Organizational Behavior and Human Performance · doi:10.1016/0030-5073(73)90017-2 · Cited by 163
The Decision to Seed Hurricanes
Howard, R. A., Matheson, J. E., & North, D. (1972) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.176.4040.1191 · Cited by 156
Assessment and evaluation of subjective probability distributions
von Holstein, S., & Carl-Axel, S. (1970) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 111
Subjective Probability and Its Measurement
Hampton, J. M., Moore, P. G., & Thomas, H. (1973) · Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A (General) · doi:10.2307/2344419 · Cited by 106
Cited by
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.2.136 · Cited by 3,024
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Metadata
- Authors
- Spetzler, C. S., & Staël Von Holstein, C.-A. S.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 1975-11
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 340-358
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2063760437
- Cited by
- 662
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 8.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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