The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games
Open accessAbstract
This paper explores some of the consequences of adopting a modern subjective view of probability for game theory. The consequences are substantial. The subjective view of probability clarifies the important distinction between normative and positive theorizing about behavior in games, a distinction that is often lost in the search for “solution concepts” which largely characterizes game theory since the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern. Many of the distinctions that appear important in conventional game theory (two-person versus n-person, zero-sum versus variable sum) appear unimportant in the subjective formulation. Other distinctions, such as single play versus repetitive-play games, appear to be more important in the subjective formulation than in the conventional formulation.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497
Theory of games and economic behavior
(2019) · 100 Years of Math Milestones · doi:10.1090/mbk/121/32 · Cited by 16,632
Statistical Decision Functions
Wald, A. (1949) · The Annals of Mathematical Statistics · doi:10.1214/aoms/1177730030 · Cited by 2,176
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model
Harsanyi, J. C. (2004) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0270 · Cited by 2,127
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtenstein, S. (1977) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.28.020177.000245 · Cited by 1,731
Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations
Savage, L. J. (1971) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1971.10482346 · Cited by 1,226
Theory of Games and Statistical Decisions.
Vajda, S., Blackwell, D., & Girshick, M. A. (1955) · Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (General) · doi:10.2307/2342525 · Cited by 1,032
An Introduction to Positive Political Theory
Riker, W. H., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1973) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 972
Rapoport, A. (1965) · Cited by 946
Aumann, R. J., & Shapley, L. S. (2015) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400867080 · Cited by 742
Berry, D. A., & DeGroot, M. (1978) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2286553 · Cited by 625
A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
Harsanyi, J. C., & Selten, R. (1972) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.18.5.80 · Cited by 580
1. Bayesian Statistics a Review
Lindley, D. V. (1972) · Bayesian Statistics · doi:10.1137/1.9781611970654.ch1 · Cited by 521
Cognitive Processes and the Assessment of Subjective Probability Distributions
Hogarth, R. M. (1975) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1975.10479858 · Cited by 479
Models of Market Organization with Imperfect Information: A Survey
Rothschild, M. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260128 · Cited by 431
Popular induction: Information is not necessarily informative
Nisbett, R. E., Borgida, E., Crandall, R., & Reed, H. (1982) · Judgment under Uncertainty · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477.008 · Cited by 295
Interactive Elicitation of Opinion for a Normal Linear Model
Kadane, J. B., Dickey, J. M., Winkler, R. L., Smith, W. S., & Peters, S. C. (1980) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1980.10477562 · Cited by 294
Self-citationStudies in Bayesian Econometrics and Statistics
J., J. E. (1975) · Technometrics · doi:10.1080/00401706.1975.10489358 · Cited by 241
28. Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Games
Aumann, R. J. (1964) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400882014-029 · Cited by 217
Rapoport, A., & Orwant, C. (2007) · Behavioral Science · doi:10.1002/bs.3830070102 · Cited by 170
Bargaining in ignorance of the opponent's utility function
Harsanyi, J. C. (1962) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/002200276200600104 · Cited by 121
A Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory
Simon, H. A. (1956) · Psychometrika · doi:10.1007/bf02289136 · Cited by 116
On solutions of Bayesian games
Böge, W., & Eisele, T. (1979) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766706 · Cited by 116
Theory of Probability Harold Jeffreys (Third edition, 447 + ix pp., Oxford Univ. Press, 84s.)
Good, I. J. (1962) · Geophysical Journal International · doi:10.1093/gji.6.4.555 · Cited by 86
Bayesian games as stochastic processes
Sanghvi, A. P., & Sobel, M. J. (1976) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01770983 · Cited by 22
Zero-Sum Games with “Almost” Perfect Information
Ponssard, J. (1975) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.21.7.794 · Cited by 17
Eliashberg, J. (1981) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.27.7.785 · Cited by 14
Verification of forecasts expressed in terms of probability
BRIER, G. W. (1950) · Monthly Weather Review · doi:10.1175/1520-0493(1950)078%3c0001:vofeit%3e2.0.co;2 · cited 1×
“This literature is very close to material on proper scoring rules (Brier, [8]).”
BackgroundVERIFICATION OF FORECASTS EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF PROBABILITY
BRIER, G. W. (1950) · Monthly Weather Review · doi:10.1175/1520-0493(1950)078<0001:vofeit>2.0.co;2
Cited by
Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
Aumann, R. J. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911154 · Cited by 1,613
Global Games: Theory and Applications
Morris, S., & Shin, H. S. (2010) · Advances in Economics and Econometrics · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610240.004 · Cited by 926
Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review
Sebenius, J. K. (1992) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.38.1.18 · Cited by 366
A Framework for Sequential Planning in Multi-Agent Settings
Gmytrasiewicz, P. J., & Doshi, P. (2005) · Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research · doi:10.1613/jair.1579 · Cited by 360
A framework for the formation and structure of consumer expectations: Review and propositions
Oliver, R. L., & Winer, R. S. (1987) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/0167-4870(87)90037-7 · Cited by 277
Metadata
- Authors
- Kadane, J. B., & Larkey, P. D.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 1982-02
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 113-120
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2124377041
- Cited by
- 269
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 11.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.