A Self-Fulfilling Cycle of Coercive Surveillance: Workers’ Invisibility Practices and Managerial Justification
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In the past few decades, the growth of surveillance has become a fixture of organizational life. Past scholarship has largely explained this growth as the result of traditional managerial demands for added control over workers, coupled with newly available cheap technology (such as closed-circuit televisions and body-worn cameras). We draw on the workplace resistance literature to complement these views by suggesting that workers can also drive such growth. More specifically, we show that workers under surveillance can feel constantly observed and seen, but they can also feel largely unnoticed as individuals by management. This paradoxical experience leads them to interpret the surveillance as coercive and to engage in invisibility practices to attempt to go unseen and remain unnoticed. Management, in turn, interprets these attempts as justification for more surveillance, which encourages workers to engage in even more invisibility practices, thus creating a self-fulfilling cycle of coercive surveillance. Our study therefore offers one of the first endogenous explanations for the growth of surveillance while also isolating unique forms of resistance attached to such surveillance. The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2017.1175 .
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BackgroundOn the Run: Wanted Men in a Philadelphia Ghetto
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“In the past few decades, surveillance has permeated numerous social arenas, including inner cities and school systems (e.g., Goffman 2009, 2015; Monahan and Torre 2010).”
Surveillant intentions and intrinsic motivation.
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“…of the adverse effects of surveillance on employees’ motivation, job satisfaction, and even productivity (Lepper et al. 1975, Grant and Higgins 1989, Enzle et al. 1993, Bernstein 2012), managers have continued to adopt technology-enabled surveillance widely throughout contemporary work settings.”
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Algorithms at Work: The New Contested Terrain of Control
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Achieving Rigor in Qualitative Analysis: The Role of Active Categorization in Theory Building
Grodal, S., Anteby, M., & Holm, A. L. (2021) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2018.0482 · Cited by 646
Self-citationWorking for an Algorithm: Power Asymmetries and Agency in Online Work Settings
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“In the second instance, workers deliberately develop tactics to elude supervision (Vallas, 2006; Anteby and Chan, 2018) or exploit technological malfunctions to occupy areas of uncertainty (Crozier and Friedberg, 1980).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Anteby, M., & Chan, C. K.
- Venue
- Organization Science
- Published
- 2018-04
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 247-263
- ISSN
- 1047-7039 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5455
- OpenAlex
- W2794492739
- Cited by
- 142
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 92.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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