Working for an Algorithm: Power Asymmetries and Agency in Online Work Settings
Open accessAbstract
Drawing on interviews with 77 high-performing eBay business sellers in France and Belgium, this article investigates the power asymmetries generated by customers’ evaluations in online work settings. Sellers revealed a high degree of sensitivity to negative reviews, which, while infrequent, triggered feelings of anxiety and vulnerability. Their accounts exposed power asymmetries at two levels: the transactional level between sellers and customers and the governance level between sellers and eBay. Our findings highlight three main mechanisms underlying power asymmetries in this context. First, online customer evaluations have created a new form of employee monitoring in which power is exercised through the construction of visibility gaps between buyers and sellers and through an implicit coalition between buyers and the platform owner, who join together in the evaluation procedures. Second, by mediating and objectifying relations, algorithms reproduce power asymmetries among the different categories of actors, thereby constraining human agency. Third, online customer evaluations prompt sellers to exploit their practical knowledge of the algorithm to increase their agency. Through the lived experience of working for an algorithm, our findings contribute new understandings of power and agency in online work settings.
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The opacity of machine learning algorithms creates a black box that challenges professional groups' knowledge claims and prevents them from questioning AI judgements and outputs.
“In particular, the opacity of machine learning algorithms is seen as creating a 'black box' which represents a challenge to the knowledge claims of professional groups and prevents them from questioning the judgements and outputs produced by AI (Curchod et al., 2020).”
From The AI of the Beholder: Intra‐Professional Sensemaking of an Epistemic Technology (2025) · cites this paper as Curchod et al., 2020
The paper says algorithmic instructions are generally kept secret (Practices for Increasing Agency, p. 41) and that eBay sellers struggle to communicate and justify their actions under automated evaluations (Discussion, p. 37). It does not address machine-learning systems challenging professional groups’ knowledge claims, and it does not say people are prevented from questioning AI outputs; it describes sellers developing ways to work around the algorithm (p. 41). (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe impact of using algorithmic management to set goals on the reduction of workers' autonomy has been outlined by many scholars, namely in gig work where autonomy in task selection is often viewed by externals as a major advantage of platform-based work.
“The impact of the use of AM to set goals on the reduction of workers' autonomy has been outlined by many scholars, namely in gig-work where autonomy in task selection is often viewed by externals as a major advantage of platform-based work (Curchod, Patriotta, Cohen, & Neysen, 2019;Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019;Griesbach et al., 2019;Rosenblat, 2018;Shapiro, 2018).”
From Algorithms as work designers: How algorithmic management influences the design of jobs (2022) · cites this paper as Curchod et al., 2019
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredAlgorithmic goal setting is negatively associated with job autonomy.
“Goal setting Autonomy (-)”
From Algorithms as work designers: How algorithmic management influences the design of jobs (2022) · cites this paper as Curchod et al. (2019)
In Practices for Increasing Agency (p. 40), the paper says sellers comply with eBay’s performance targets under algorithmic monitoring and describes efforts to increase their autonomy. The Discussion (p. 37) says algorithmic procedures diminish sellers’ agency. These passages support the general direction of the claim, but the paper does not establish a specific negative association between algorithmic goal setting and job autonomy. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredPlatforms rely on machine-learning algorithms to filter and control uploaded content.
“platforms rely on machine-learning algorithms to filter and control uploaded content”
From Content Creators Between Platform Control and User Autonomy: The Role of Algorithms and Revenue Sharing (2023) · cites this paper as Curchod et al. 2020
The Discussion (p. 37) says platform algorithms regulate interactions among buyers and sellers, including evaluations and seller downgrades. It does not establish that these are machine-learning algorithms or that they filter and control uploaded content; the passages found concern transactions and seller evaluations instead. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredOther studies have found that content creators are 'leveraging algorithms' and 'working around the algorithm' by constantly uploading, A/B testing, and diversifying their incomes.
“Other studies have found that content creators are ‘leveraging algorithms’ (Kellogg et al. 2020, p. 391) and ‘working around the algorithm’ (Curchod et al. 2020, p. 17) by constantly uploading (Arriagada and Ibáñez 2020), A/B testing (Cotter 2019), and diversifying their incomes (Cutolo and Kenney 2021).”
From Content Creators Between Platform Control and User Autonomy: The Role of Algorithms and Revenue Sharing (2023) · cites this paper as Curchod et al. 2020
The section “Sellers’ Working around the Algorithm” (p. 27) uses that phrase for practices by eBay sellers to mitigate power asymmetries. It does not establish the claim for content creators as a group. The uploading, A/B testing, and income-diversification examples are attached to other citations, not to Curchod et al. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Algorithmic systems facilitate high contingency of performance scores on customer satisfaction ratings in gig work and traditional work settings.
“Moreover, algorithmic systems facilitate high contingency of performance scores on customer satisfaction ratings, both in gig work (Curchod et al., 2019;Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019;Griesbach et al., 2019) and in traditional work settings such as restaurants (O'Donovan, 2018), retail (Evans & Kitchin, 2018;Levy & Barocas, 2018), or telecommunications (Bakewell et al., 2018).”
From Algorithms as work designers: How algorithmic management influences the design of jobs (2022) · cites this paper as Curchod et al., 2019
The strong impact of customer satisfaction ratings has been associated with workers' perception of job insecurity.
“The strong impact of these ratings, largely questioned about their volatility, the reliability and validity (Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019;Greenwood, Adjerid, & Angst, 2019;Luca & Zervas, 2016;Orlikowski & Scott, 2013;Rosenblat, Levy, Barocas, & Hwang, 2017), has been associated with workers' perception of job insecurity (Curchod et al., 2019;Veen et al., 2019).”
From Algorithms as work designers: How algorithmic management influences the design of jobs (2022) · cites this paper as Curchod et al., 2019
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Cites
Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511815355 · Cited by 33,219 · see citing works
Orlikowski, W. J. (2000) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.11.4.404.14600 · Cited by 4,760 · see citing works
10 Sociomateriality: Challenging the Separation of Technology, Work and Organization
Orlikowski, W. J., & Scott, S. V. (2008) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/19416520802211644 · Cited by 2,571 · see citing works
Sampling in qualitative research. Purposeful and theoretical sampling: Merging or clear boundaries?
Coyne, I. T. (1997) · Journal of Advanced Nursing · doi:10.1046/j.1365-2648.1997.t01-25-00999.x · Cited by 2,402 · see citing works
The social power of algorithms
Beer, D. (2017) · Information, Communication & Society · doi:10.1080/1369118x.2016.1216147 · Cited by 945 · cited 1× · see citing works
“As calculative objects, algorithms operate in subtle ways: they are ‘‘virtuals’’ that generate a whole variety of ‘‘actuals’’; they are compressed and hidden, and we do not encounter them in the way that we encounter traditional rules (Lash, 2007; Beer, 2009, 2017).”
Background
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Algorithms as work designers: How algorithmic management influences the design of jobs
Parent-Rocheleau, X., & Parker, S. K. (2022) · Human Resource Management Review · doi:10.1016/j.hrmr.2021.100838 · Cited by 512 · see citing works
Chen, L., Tong, T. W., Tang, S., & Han, N. (2022) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/01492063211045023 · Cited by 345 · see citing works
The dark sides of people analytics: Reviewing the perils for organisations and employees
Giermindl, L. M., Strich, F., Christ, O., Leicht-Deobald, U., & Redzepi, A. (2022) · European Journal of Information Systems · doi:10.1080/0960085x.2021.1927213 · Cited by 331 · see citing works
Algorithmic control and gig workers: a legitimacy perspective of Uber drivers
Wiener, M., Cram, W. A., & Benlian, A. (2023) · European Journal of Information Systems · doi:10.1080/0960085x.2021.1977729 · Cited by 251 · see citing works
“‘Making out’ While Driving: Relational and Efficiency Games in the Gig Economy.”
Cameron, L. D. (2022) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2021.1547 · Cited by 183 · see citing works
Waldkirch, M., Bucher, E., Schou, P. K., & Grünwald, E. (2021) · The International Journal of Human Resource Management · doi:10.1080/09585192.2021.1914129 · Cited by 173 · see citing works
“Our findings indicate that within the context of Upwork, there is a much larger power asymmetry between workers on the one hand as well as the platform and clients on the other hand (Curchod et al. , 2020).”
BackgroundIs AI recruiting (un) ethical? A human rights perspective on the use of AI for hiring
Hunkenschroer, A. L., & Kriebitz, A. (2023) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-022-00166-4 · Cited by 111 · see citing works
The AI of the Beholder: Intra‐Professional Sensemaking of an Epistemic Technology
Scarbrough, H., Chen, Y., & Patriotta, G. (2025) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/joms.13065 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
Self-citationHödl, T., & Myrach, T. (2023) · Business & Information Systems Engineering · doi:10.1007/s12599-023-00808-9 · Cited by 51 · see citing works
Reviews, trust, and customer experience in online marketplaces: the case of Mercado Libre Colombia
Peña-García, N., Losada-Otálora, M., Auza, D. P., & Cruz, M. P. (2024) · Frontiers in Communication · doi:10.3389/fcomm.2024.1460321 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
- Authors
- Curchod, C., Patriotta, G., Cohen, L., & Neysen, N.
- Affiliations
- University of Edinburgh (GB)
- University of Warwick (GB)
- University of Nottingham (GB)
- University of Liège (BE)
- Corresponding author
- Curchod, Corentin
- Venue
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2019-07-25
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 644-676
- ISSN
- 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
- 1930-3815
- OpenAlex
- W2949707148
- Cited by
- 364
- References
- 5
- Citations by year
- 2026: 65 · 2025: 71 · 2024: 63 · 2023: 48 · 2022: 46 · 2021: 42 · 2020: 27 · 2019: 2
- FWCI
- 58.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Locations
- Administrative Science Quarterly (publishedVersion)
- Warwick Research Archive Portal (University of Warwick) (acceptedVersion)
- Repository@Nottingham (University of Nottingham) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
- Repository@Nottingham (University of Nottingham) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- ORBi (University of Liège) (submittedVersion)
- Edinburgh Research Explorer (University of Edinburgh) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Digital Economy and Work Transformation
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Industrial relations › Legal and Labor Studies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Keywords
- power imbalance, human agency, online labour, algorithmic governance, employee monitoring, platform power, eBay, online marketplaces, buyer-seller relations
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review