Cited by 364Digital Economy and Work TransformationLegal and Labor StudiesDigital Platforms and Economics

Working for an Algorithm: Power Asymmetries and Agency in Online Work Settings

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Curchod, Corentin, Patriotta, Gerardo, Cohen, Laurie, Neysen, Nicolas·2020·Administrative Science Quarterly

Abstract

Drawing on interviews with 77 high-performing eBay business sellers in France and Belgium, this article investigates the power asymmetries generated by customers’ evaluations in online work settings. Sellers revealed a high degree of sensitivity to negative reviews, which, while infrequent, triggered feelings of anxiety and vulnerability. Their accounts exposed power asymmetries at two levels: the transactional level between sellers and customers and the governance level between sellers and eBay. Our findings highlight three main mechanisms underlying power asymmetries in this context. First, online customer evaluations have created a new form of employee monitoring in which power is exercised through the construction of visibility gaps between buyers and sellers and through an implicit coalition between buyers and the platform owner, who join together in the evaluation procedures. Second, by mediating and objectifying relations, algorithms reproduce power asymmetries among the different categories of actors, thereby constraining human agency. Third, online customer evaluations prompt sellers to exploit their practical knowledge of the algorithm to increase their agency. Through the lived experience of working for an algorithm, our findings contribute new understandings of power and agency in online work settings.

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  • The opacity of machine learning algorithms creates a black box that challenges professional groups' knowledge claims and prevents them from questioning AI judgements and outputs.

    “In particular, the opacity of machine learning algorithms is seen as creating a 'black box' which represents a challenge to the knowledge claims of professional groups and prevents them from questioning the judgements and outputs produced by AI (Curchod et al., 2020).”

    From The AI of the Beholder: Intra‐Professional Sensemaking of an Epistemic Technology (2025) · cites this paper as Curchod et al., 2020

    The paper says algorithmic instructions are generally kept secret (Practices for Increasing Agency, p. 41) and that eBay sellers struggle to communicate and justify their actions under automated evaluations (Discussion, p. 37). It does not address machine-learning systems challenging professional groups’ knowledge claims, and it does not say people are prevented from questioning AI outputs; it describes sellers developing ways to work around the algorithm (p. 41). (LLM, conf=0.86)

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  • The impact of using algorithmic management to set goals on the reduction of workers' autonomy has been outlined by many scholars, namely in gig work where autonomy in task selection is often viewed by externals as a major advantage of platform-based work.

    “The impact of the use of AM to set goals on the reduction of workers' autonomy has been outlined by many scholars, namely in gig-work where autonomy in task selection is often viewed by externals as a major advantage of platform-based work (Curchod, Patriotta, Cohen, & Neysen, 2019;Gerber & Krzywdzinski, 2019;Griesbach et al., 2019;Rosenblat, 2018;Shapiro, 2018).”

    From Algorithms as work designers: How algorithmic management influences the design of jobs (2022) · cites this paper as Curchod et al., 2019

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  • Algorithmic goal setting is negatively associated with job autonomy.

    “Goal setting Autonomy (-)”

    From Algorithms as work designers: How algorithmic management influences the design of jobs (2022) · cites this paper as Curchod et al. (2019)

    In Practices for Increasing Agency (p. 40), the paper says sellers comply with eBay’s performance targets under algorithmic monitoring and describes efforts to increase their autonomy. The Discussion (p. 37) says algorithmic procedures diminish sellers’ agency. These passages support the general direction of the claim, but the paper does not establish a specific negative association between algorithmic goal setting and job autonomy. (LLM, conf=0.84)

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  • Platforms rely on machine-learning algorithms to filter and control uploaded content.

    “platforms rely on machine-learning algorithms to filter and control uploaded content”

    From Content Creators Between Platform Control and User Autonomy: The Role of Algorithms and Revenue Sharing (2023) · cites this paper as Curchod et al. 2020

    The Discussion (p. 37) says platform algorithms regulate interactions among buyers and sellers, including evaluations and seller downgrades. It does not establish that these are machine-learning algorithms or that they filter and control uploaded content; the passages found concern transactions and seller evaluations instead. (LLM, conf=0.84)

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  • Other studies have found that content creators are 'leveraging algorithms' and 'working around the algorithm' by constantly uploading, A/B testing, and diversifying their incomes.

    “Other studies have found that content creators are ‘leveraging algorithms’ (Kellogg et al. 2020, p. 391) and ‘working around the algorithm’ (Curchod et al. 2020, p. 17) by constantly uploading (Arriagada and Ibáñez 2020), A/B testing (Cotter 2019), and diversifying their incomes (Cutolo and Kenney 2021).”

    From Content Creators Between Platform Control and User Autonomy: The Role of Algorithms and Revenue Sharing (2023) · cites this paper as Curchod et al. 2020

    The section “Sellers’ Working around the Algorithm” (p. 27) uses that phrase for practices by eBay sellers to mitigate power asymmetries. It does not establish the claim for content creators as a group. The uploading, A/B testing, and income-diversification examples are attached to other citations, not to Curchod et al. (LLM, conf=0.84)

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Authors
Curchod, C., Patriotta, G., Cohen, L., & Neysen, N.
Affiliations
  • University of Edinburgh (GB)
  • University of Warwick (GB)
  • University of Nottingham (GB)
  • University of Liège (BE)
Corresponding author
Curchod, Corentin
Venue
Administrative Science Quarterly
Published
2019-07-25
Volume
65
Issue
3
Pages
644-676
ISSN
  • 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
  • 1930-3815
OpenAlex
W2949707148
Cited by
364
References
5
Citations by year
2026: 65 · 2025: 71 · 2024: 63 · 2023: 48 · 2022: 46 · 2021: 42 · 2020: 27 · 2019: 2
FWCI
58.91
Type
journal article
Language
en
Locations
  • Administrative Science Quarterly (publishedVersion)
  • Warwick Research Archive Portal (University of Warwick) (acceptedVersion)
  • Repository@Nottingham (University of Nottingham) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
  • Repository@Nottingham (University of Nottingham) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • ORBi (University of Liège) (submittedVersion)
  • Edinburgh Research Explorer (University of Edinburgh) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Digital Economy and Work Transformation
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Industrial relations › Legal and Labor Studies
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
Keywords
power imbalance, human agency, online labour, algorithmic governance, employee monitoring, platform power, eBay, online marketplaces, buyer-seller relations

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