The bias blind spot: perceptions of bias in self versus others
Abstract
Three studies suggest that individuals see the existence and operation of cognitive and motivational biases much more in others than in themselves. Study 1 provides evidence from three surveys that people rate themselves as less subject to various biases than the “average American,” classmates in a seminar, and fellow airport travelers. Data from the third survey further suggest that such claims arise from the interplay among availability biases and self-enhancement motives. Participants in one follow-up study who showed the better-than-average bias insisted that their self-assessments were accurate and objective even after reading a description of how they could have been affected by the relevant bias. Participants in a final study reported their peer’s self-serving attributions regarding test performance to be biased but their own similarly self-serving attributions to be free of bias. The relevance of these phenomena to naïve realism and to conflict, misunderstanding, and dispute resolution is discussed.
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The Self-Correction Blind Spot is inherited from human demonstrations through the training pipeline.
“The Self-Correction Blind Spot bears surface resemblance to the bias blind spot (the tendency to overlook one's own biases) (Pronin et al., 2002), though we trace its cause to training data composition and argue in Section 5 that the blind spot is inherited from human demonstrations through the training pipeline.”
From Self-Correction Bench: Uncovering and Addressing the Self-Correction Blind Spot in Large Language Models (2025) · cites this paper as Pronin et al., 2002
Cognitive biases are largely implicit and unconscious and feel quite naturally and self-evident when we are aware of these cognitive inclinations.
“These tendencies are largely implicit and unconscious and feel quite naturally and self/evident when we are aware of these cognitive inclinations (Pronin et al., 2002; Risen, 2015; Korteling et al., 2018b).”
From Human- versus Artificial Intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as Pronin et al., 2002
The objectivity illusion can lead to a failure to recognize the ways in which one's own thinking is distorted by non-rational influences (the 'bias blind spot').
“This, in turn, can lead to a failure to recognize the ways in which one’s own thinking is distorted by non-rational influences (the ‘bias blind spot’121).”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [121]
Across the four studies in Pronin et al. (2002), sample size ranged from 24 to 91, with an average of 55 per study.
“Across the four studies reported in the original paper, the sample size ranged from 24 to 91, with an average sample size of 55 per study.”
From Agency and self-other asymmetries in perceived bias and shortcomings: Replications of the Bias Blind Spot and link to free will beliefs (2021) · cites this paper as Pronin et al. (2002)
The effect size of the replications for denial of the better than average effect was around twice the effect size of the original study.
“The effect size of the replications (Study 1b: d z = 1.43;Study 3: d z = 1.27) was around twice the effect size of the original study (d z = 0.70).”
From Agency and self-other asymmetries in perceived bias and shortcomings: Replications of the Bias Blind Spot and link to free will beliefs (2021) · cites this paper as Pronin et al. (2002)
Bias blind spot (BBS) is the phenomenon that people perceive themselves to be less susceptible to biases than others.
“Bias blind spot (BBS) is the phenomenon that people perceive themselves to be less susceptible to biases than others.”
From Agency and self-other asymmetries in perceived bias and shortcomings: Replications of the Bias Blind Spot and link to free will beliefs (2021) · cites this paper as Pronin et al. (2002)
Pronin et al. (2002) predicted that the self-versus-others asymmetry is larger for biases than for personal shortcomings.
“Based on this argument, the authors predicted that the self-versus-others asymmetry is larger for biases than for personal shortcomings.”
From Agency and self-other asymmetries in perceived bias and shortcomings: Replications of the Bias Blind Spot and link to free will beliefs (2021) · cites this paper as Pronin et al. (2002)
Pronin et al. (2002) provided the first demonstration of BBS by showing that people tend to perceive themselves as less biased, even when made aware of their potential bias.
“Pronin et al. (2002) provided the first demonstration of the effect by examining people's ratings of susceptibility to common biases in themselves and in others, and showed that people tend to perceive themselves as being less biased, even when being made aware of their potential bias.”
From Agency and self-other asymmetries in perceived bias and shortcomings: Replications of the Bias Blind Spot and link to free will beliefs (2021) · cites this paper as Pronin et al. (2002)
Pronin et al. (2002) found empirical evidence that the sources of BBS are not restricted to self-serving motives.
“Specifically, Pronin et al. (2002) found empirical evidence for the view that the sources of BBS are not restricted to self-serving motives.”
From Agency and self-other asymmetries in perceived bias and shortcomings: Replications of the Bias Blind Spot and link to free will beliefs (2021) · cites this paper as Pronin et al. (2002)
Study 1 Survey 2 of Pronin et al. (2002) found support that people rate themselves as less susceptible to biases than others, but no support for self-other asymmetry in personal shortcomings.
“Study 1 Survey 2 of Pronin et al. (2002) found empirical support for the view that people rate themselves, compared with others, to be less susceptible to biases, whereas there was no support for self-other asymmetry in ratings of personal shortcomings.”
From Agency and self-other asymmetries in perceived bias and shortcomings: Replications of the Bias Blind Spot and link to free will beliefs (2021) · cites this paper as Pronin et al. (2002)
The original study (Pronin et al., 2002) had underpowered samples.
“We addressed one of the potential methodological shortcomings, the underpowered samples in the original study.”
From Agency and self-other asymmetries in perceived bias and shortcomings: Replications of the Bias Blind Spot and link to free will beliefs (2021) · cites this paper as Pronin et al. (2002)
Naïve realism produces the bias blind spot, the ability to detect biased reasoning in others but not in oneself.
“It also produces the “bias blind spot”-the ability to detect when others engage in biased reasoning, but without the ability to recognize bias in oneself (Pronin et al., 2002).”
From Lessons from the field: Isn't it just common sense? Naïve realism as a barrier to learning (2024) · cites this paper as Pronin et al., 2002
People commonly exhibit a bias blind spot, judging themselves as less susceptible to bias than the average other.
“While people readily recognize these biases in others, they often fail to perceive the same biases in themselves (Pronin et al., 2002).”
From Everyone I Don’t Like Is Biased: Affective Evaluations and the Bias Blind Spot (2026) · cites this paper as Pronin et al., 2002
People are less likely to acknowledge exhibiting biases that they perceive as socially undesirable.
“People are less likely to acknowledge exhibiting biases that they perceive as socially undesirable (Pronin et al., 2002).”
From Everyone I Don’t Like Is Biased: Affective Evaluations and the Bias Blind Spot (2026) · cites this paper as Pronin et al., 2002
Unfamiliar neutral targets are already perceived as substantially more biased than the self.
“Moreover, because unfamiliar neutral targets are already perceived as substantially more biased than the self (Mandel et al., 2022; Pronin et al., 2002), both unfamiliarity and negative affect may lead to similar conclusions—that a target other is considerably more biased than oneself.”
From Everyone I Don’t Like Is Biased: Affective Evaluations and the Bias Blind Spot (2026) · cites this paper as Pronin et al., 2002
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“To the best of our knowledge, there are no published direct replications of Pronin et al. (2002).”
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- Authors
- Pronin, E., Lin, D. Y., & Ross, L.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Stanford University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Pronin, Emily
- ORCID
- Pronin, Emily
- Venue
- Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2002-03
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 369-381
- ISSN
- 0146-1672 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-7433
- OpenAlex
- W2036469702
- Cited by
- 1,289
- References
- 33
- Citations by year
- 2026: 59 · 2025: 94 · 2024: 89 · 2023: 119 · 2022: 108 · 2021: 89 · 2020: 115 · 2019: 80 · 2018: 64 · 2017: 66 · 2016: 51 · 2015: 53 · 2014: 39 · 2013: 56 · 2012: 28
- FWCI
- 95.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Clinical Psychology › Personality Traits and Psychology
- Keywords
- bias blind spot, self-other bias, cognitive biases, motivational biases, self-enhancement, availability bias, better-than-average effect, self-serving attribution, naive realism, interpersonal conflict, dispute resolution
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