The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament
Open accessAbstract
Despite a sophisticated understanding of the impact of electoral institutions on macrolevel political behavior, little is known about the relationship between these institutions and microlevel legislative behavior. This article reviews existing claims about this relationship and develops a model for predicting how electoral institutions affect the relationship between parliamentarians and their party principals in the context of the European Parliament. The European Parliament is an ideal laboratory for investigating these effects, because in each European Union member state, different institutions are used to elect Members of European Parliament (MEPs). The results of this model, tested on four hundred thousand individual MEP vote decisions, show that candidate-centered electoral systems (such as open-list proportional representation or single-transferable-vote systems) and decentralized candidate-selection rules produce parliamentarians independent from their party principals. By contrast, party-centered electoral systems (such as closed-list proportional representation systems) and centralized candidate-selection rules produce parliamentarians beholden to the parties that fight elections and choose candidates: in the case of the European Parliament, the national parties.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables.
MTW, & Long, J. S. (1997) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2965458 · Cited by 6,898
Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables
Calvin, J. A. (1998) · Technometrics · doi:10.1080/00401706.1998.10485496 · Cited by 5,201
Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.1980.tb00737.x · Cited by 2,750
Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas
Carey, J. M., & Shugart, M. S. (1995) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/0261-3794(94)00035-2 · Cited by 2,663
Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems
Cox, G. W. (1997) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174954 · Cited by 2,281
The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws
Groennings, S., & Rae, D. W. (1968) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/446528 · Cited by 1,766
Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990
Lijphart, A. (1994) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198273479.001.0001 · Cited by 1,760
Making votes count: strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems
(1998) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.35-2982 · Cited by 1,753
Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies
Boix, C. (1999) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585577 · Cited by 940
Choosing Europe? The European electorate and national politics in the face of union
(1997) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/s0261-3794(97)83128-9 · Cited by 751
Cited by
Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting
Carey, J. M. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00239.x · Cited by 701
Legislative Voting and Accountability
Carey, J. M. (2008) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511810077 · Cited by 466
Democratic politics in the European Parliament
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-3439 · Cited by 409
Institutional Foundations of Legislative Speech
Proksch, S., & Slapin, J. B. (2012) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00565.x · Cited by 282
Ideology, Grandstanding, and Strategic Party Disloyalty in the British Parliament
SLAPIN, J. B., KIRKLAND, J. H., LAZZARO, J. A., LESLIE, P. A., & O’GRADY, T. (2018) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055417000375 · Cited by 84
Metadata
- Authors
- Hix, S.
- Venue
- World Politics
- Publisher
- Project MUSE
- Published
- 2004-01
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 194-223
- ISSN
- 0043-8871 (ISSN-L)
- 1086-3338
- OpenAlex
- W2000834367
- Cited by
- 332
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 36.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.