The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Fiscal Contract: States, Taxes, and Public Services
Open accessAbstract
Using data from approximately ninety countries, the author shows that the more a state taxes the rich as a percentage of GDP, the more it protects property rights; and the more it taxes the poor, the more it provides basic public services. There is no evidence that states gouge the rich to benefit the poor or vice versa, contrary to state-capture theories. Nor is there any evidence that taxes and spending are unrelated, contrary to state-autonomy models. Instead, states operate much like fiscal contracts, with groups getting what they pay for.
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Cites
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The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services
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Metadata
- Authors
- Timmons, J. F.
- Venue
- World Politics
- Publisher
- Project MUSE
- Published
- 2005-07
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 530-567
- ISSN
- 0043-8871 (ISSN-L)
- 1086-3338
- OpenAlex
- W2146683949
- Cited by
- 300
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 9.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.